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FINDING INTERNATIONAL LAW, PART II: OUR
FRAGMENTING LEGAL COMMUNITY
HARLAN GRANT COHEN*
Is there an “International Community”?  This Article suggests that
there is not, that the oft-discussed fragmentation of international law reveals
that there are in fact multiple overlapping and competing international law
communities, each with differing views on law and legitimacy.
This Article reaches this conclusion by taking a fresh look not only at
the sources of fragmentation, but at the sources of international law itself.
Building on earlier work rethinking international law’s sources and draw-
ing insights from legal philosophy, compliance theory, and international
relations, this Article takes a closer look at three areas that have challenged
traditional interpretations of international law: (1) human rights, (2)
global administrative law, and (3) the law applied by international tribu-
nals.  What it finds is that the challenges posed by each area run much
deeper than doctrine; in fact, in each area a new legal community has
formed that no longer shares traditional international law’s understanding
of legitimate lawmaking.  These legal communities no longer recognize a
single, unifying doctrine of sources.
Such a realization puts conflicts over international law in a new light.
To the extent that debates between human rights and international humani-
tarian law or trade law and the environment represent debates over the stan-
dards for legitimate lawmaking rather than conflicts over interpretation,
doctrinal fixes will never fully resolve them.  Instead, they must be viewed as
true conflicts of law; resolutions must mediate between the overlapping de-
mands of different legal communities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The potential fragmentation of international law has gar-
nered a great deal of attention over the past ten years.  Inter-
national law’s rapid expansion into almost every area of
human affairs paired with the seemingly sudden proliferation
of international tribunals, courts, and interpretative bodies has
led to increased disagreement over international rules and in-
creasingly divergent decisions on international law obligations.
The absence of obvious or agreed-upon mechanisms for
resolving these disputes has threatened to tear international
law apart at the seams.  Finding a way to keep the fabric of
international law whole or to mend the tears once they have
formed has become a practical and scholarly obsession,1 re-
sulting most notably in a report from the International Law
Commission.2
1. See, e.g., Symposium, The Normalizing of Adjudication in Complex Interna-
tional Governance Regimes: Patterns, Possibilities, and Problems, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L
L. & POL.755–1012 (2009); Symposium, Diversity or Cacophony: New Sources of
Norms in International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 845 (2004); Symposium, The
Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
679 (1999).
2. U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the Study Group on the Fragmentation
of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of
International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by
Martti Koskenniemi) [hereinafter, U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation Re-
port].
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Most of these responses have cast the fragmentation of in-
ternational law in doctrinal or technical terms.3  Human rights
bodies, trade and investment tribunals, regional courts, and a
myriad of other international actors disagree on the meaning
of particular treaties or international law rules, the relation-
ship between them, and who should have the authority to in-
terpret them.  Some of these disagreements, like those over
the detention and targeting of alleged terrorists or the availa-
bility of generic drugs in poor countries, have become quite
bitter.  But the assumption has always been that these actors
agree on more than they disagree, that they are part of a single
international law community, that they are following the same
set of rules (even as they disagree on their exact interpreta-
tion).  Whatever disagreements they may have over interpreta-
tion, it is assumed that they agree on the basic doctrine of
sources.  These assumptions are shared by both those con-
cerned about fragmentation, who suggest doctrinal tweaks de-
signed to reconcile opposing views,4 and those who embrace
fragmentation, who suggest that the best rules for all will
emerge from competition between fora.5  Moreover, despite
3. See, e.g., Pierre-Marie Dupuy, A Doctrinal Debate in the Globalisation Era:
On the “Fragmentation” of International Law, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2007)
(analyzing “fragmentation” in doctrinal terms).  There are exceptions, most
notably, Gunther Teubner, who has argued that fragmentation reflects de-
bates between normative communities, a conceptualization that this paper
echoes. See Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions:
The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 5 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 999 (2004); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial Sys-
tem, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 449–53 (2003) (describing the role of domestic
judge-made doctrines as contributing to fragmentation).
4. See, e.g., Jo¨rg Kammerhofer, Systemic Integration, Legal Theory and the
ILC, 19 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 157 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1534086 (discussing the technical ap-
proach of the International Law Commission); Karel Wellens, Fragmentation
of International Law and Establishing an Accountability Regime for International
Organizations: The Role of the Judiciary in Closing the Gap, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L.
1159 (2004) (suggesting a broader role for the International Court of Jus-
tice).  Many approaches to fragmentation are primarily concerned with how
different adjudicatory bodies should treat the decisions of other bodies and
deal less with the substantive disagreement between those bodies than with
the types of deference or comity they should show each other.  These ap-
proaches arguably remain agnostic about the nature of the disputes in ques-
tion.
5. See, e.g., William W. Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25
MICH. J. INT’L L. 963, 970 (2004) (“On the positive side, however, the inter-
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their differences, international actors portray themselves in
much this way, as all beholden to the same traditional rules of
international law.  Human rights bodies and advocates de-
scribe new rules in traditional terms; “instant custom” is ex-
plained in terms of state practice and opinio juris.6  Interna-
tional courts hew closely to the structure of the doctrine of
sources in their opinions, even when the rules they identify
seem difficult to defend in those terms.  And scholars of
Global Administrative Law are careful to note that under the
traditional doctrine of sources, many of the private rule-mak-
ing systems they study are not international law at all.7
But what if these assumptions are wrong?  What if frag-
mentation reflects disagreements that run far deeper than
even the actors themselves are ready to admit?  This Article
argues that rote statements of fealty to the doctrine of sources
actually mask inherent disagreements over the nature and
source of legal obligations.  In an earlier article,8 I argued that
national legal system is denser, more active, and arguably more important
than ever before.”); Jacob Katz Cogan, Competition and Control in International
Adjudication, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 411, 448 (2008) (“It is entirely possible that,
after an initial period of competition in a particular substantive area, coher-
ent rules will emerge.”); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Justice as Conflict Resolu-
tion: Proliferation, Fragmentation, and Decentralization of Dispute Settlement in In-
ternational Trade, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 273, 366 (2006) (“Competing
jurisdictions among courts, as well as academic criticism of introverted do-
mestic judgments disregarding the international obligations of the country
concerned, may contribute to improving the quality and overall consistency
of judicial reasoning.”); Ruti Teitel & Robert Howse, Cross-Judging: Tribunal-
ization in a Fragmented but Interconnected Global Order, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 959, 967–68 (2009) (discussing the benefits of cross-interpretation).
6. See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to
Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 762
(2001) (describing the problem of instant custom and suggesting a way to
reconcile it with international law doctrine).
7. Sabino Cassese, The Globalization of Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
973 (2005); Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globaliz-
ing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490 (2006); Carol Harlow, Global Ad-
ministrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187
(2006); Benedict Kingsbury et al., Foreword: Global Governance as Administra-
tion—National and Transnational Approaches to Global Administrative Law, 68
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Kingsbury et al., Global Gov-
ernance as Administration]; Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A
Model for Global Administrative Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2005).
8. Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine
of Sources, 93 IOWA L. REV. 65 (2007).
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the traditional doctrine of sources had become outdated, that
a better description of the rules treated as law in the interna-
tional system would strip away the formal categories of treaty,
custom, and general principles, and ask instead how and why
particular rules come to be treated as law.  Drawing on compli-
ance theory, I argued that rules come to be treated as interna-
tional law in one of two ways:  Either (1) the rule itself can be
internalized, or (2) the rule can be legitimated by agreed-
upon, internalized, law-making or process rules.  The goals of
a revised doctrine of sources should be to identify the internal-
ized legitimacy rules of the system and test suggested “laws”
against them.
Refocused through this lens, fragmentation begins to look
different.  Instead of debates over doctrine, many of these de-
bates look instead like debates over the very processes and
principles necessary for law creation.  This Article looks at
three areas that have challenged traditional interpretations of
international law:  (1) human rights, (2) global administrative
law, and (3) the law applied by international tribunals.  It ar-
gues that in each, new views of legitimate rulemaking appear
to be emerging.  A single international law community is being
replaced by separate, overlapping legal communities with sig-
nificantly different views of law and legitimacy.  In H.L.A.
Hart’s terms,9 these diverging communities no longer share
the same secondary rules.  This Article tries to identify the
emerging legitimacy rules in each of these diverging commu-
nities.
Recognizing that these debates are debates between legal
communities rather than within one transforms attempts to re-
solve them.  To the extent that debates between human rights
and international humanitarian law or trade law and the envi-
ronment represent debates over legitimacy rather than con-
flicts over interpretation, doctrinal fixes will never fully resolve
them.  Such debates must instead be viewed as true conflicts of
law; resolutions must mediate between the overlapping de-
mands of different legal communities.  In a sense, viewing con-
flicts over international law this way recasts the fragmentation
within international law as part of much larger problems in
transnational governance.  Alongside the problem of fragmen-
9. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79–92 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing
the distinction between “primary” and “secondary” rules).
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tation within international law, scholars have also struggled to
reconcile international law with a range of competing transna-
tional and national legal systems, transnational regulatory net-
works, and private international organizations.10  Methods
used to describe and resolve those conflicts, for example, legal
pluralism,11 may be used on conflicts within international law
as well.
The Article will proceed in three parts.  Part II argues for
a fresh look at the doctrine of sources of international law.  Its
approach is multi-theoretical, finding the ingredients of this
new account already present in a series of theories aimed at
how international law works, when and why states and other
actors comply, and the nature of law.  Each suggests an ac-
count of international law doctrine that does not completely
comport with the traditional doctrine of sources.  Tying
10. Perhaps confusingly, conflicts between these different regimes, of
which Medellı´n between the United States and the ICJ, Yahoo! between
France and the United States, and possibly Kadi between Europe and the
UN, are all high-profile examples, are also sometimes referred to as frag-
mentation. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Federalism and International Law
Through the Lens of Legal Pluralism, 73 MO. L. REV. 1151, 1183 (2008) (discuss-
ing fragmentation in the context of Medellı´n); Carmen Draghici, Suspected
Terrorists’ Rights Between the Fragmentation and Merger of Legal Orders: Reflections
in the Margin of the Kadi ECJ Appeal Judgment, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L.
REV. 627, 629 (2009) (“The significant shift in jurisprudence signaled by the
Kadi judgment is the starting point for new reflections on the fragmentation
and merger of the legal phenomena in the post-modern world, and on the
place of human rights and the rule of law principle in the value system of the
international community.”); Andreas L. Paulus, The Legitimacy of International
Law and the Role of the States, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1047, 1052, 1054–55 (2004)
(reflecting on Yahoo! and fragmentation); see also Paul Schiff Berman, Global
Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1159–60 (2007) [hereinafter
Berman, Global Legal Pluralism] (discussing the three cases); Ruti Teitel,
Humanity Law:  A New Interpretive Lens on the International Sphere, 77 FORDHAM
L. REV. 667 (2008) (same).  These conflicts, however, arise from self-con-
sciously different legal regimes, and although they may reflect the “fragmen-
tation” of regulation, they do not undermine the uniformity of international
law itself.  Such conflicts are probably better termed “competition” rather
than “fragmentation.” Kadi is the one exception, straddling the line be-
tween a traditional conflict between two regimes, the E.U. and international
law, and one within international law itself.
11. See, e.g., Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 10; Paul Schiff R
Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 301
(2007) [hereinafter Berman, Pluralist Approach]; Paul Schiff Berman, Conflict
of Laws, Globalization, and Cosmopolitan Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1105
(2005) [hereinafter Berman, Conflict of Laws].
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threads together from these various theories, this Part suggests
that international law should best be seen as a combination of
two sets of rules.  The first set includes rules, both substantive
and procedural, that are directly internalized by international
actors.  Among other things, these internalized rules define
the standards of legitimacy against which future rules are to be
judged.  The second set includes rules adopted and legiti-
mated through processes laid out in the first set of rules.
Part III describes three areas of international law that
pose problems for the traditional doctrine of sources:  (1)
Human rights law, where actors seem to have coalesced
around rules regarding customary international law, treaty in-
terpretation, and reservations that appear to be in tension with
more traditional doctrine, (2) tribunal-centered law, in partic-
ular, international criminal law and trade/investment law,
where despite protestations to the contrary, precedent seems
to be taking a central role, and (3) global administrative law,
where public law principles seem to be taking hold in the ab-
sence of any traditionally binding international law.  Part III
then looks at each through the lens of a revised doctrine of
sources, asking what appear to be the legitimate lawmaking
rules that undergird each area.  Part III concludes that in each
area, a specific normative-legal community has refashioned
the legitimacy rules of the system, in essence seceding12 from
the unified vision of the traditional doctrine of sources.
Part IV explores the ramifications of taking this approach.
Many prior approaches to fragmentation have assumed that
the problem was primarily a jurisdictional one—with so many
bodies interpreting the rules and no appellate review, differ-
ences in interpretation were inevitable.  Based on that assump-
tion, those approaches sought doctrinal tie-breaker rules,13
doctrinal tweaks that could reconcile opposing rules, or juris-
dictional management rules that suggest how courts should re-
act to each other’s rulings.14  To the extent, however, that de-
12. Although in truth, they may not see it that way.  Arguably, at least in
the human rights context, the goal is to apply those new norms of legitimacy
to international law as a whole.
13. See Kammerhofer, supra note 4; Marko Milanovic, Norm Conflict in In- R
ternational Law: Whither Human Rights?, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 69, 98
(2009) (using U.N. Charter as trump in disputes).
14. See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International
Law as a Universe of Inter-connected Islands, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 903, 904 (2004)
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bates over international law rules can be traced to deeper con-
flicts over legitimate rule making, these solutions miss the
point.  A doctrinal tweak may be able to paper over the differ-
ences, but given the depth of the underlying disagreements,
they are unlikely to stay long under wraps.  A more lasting so-
lution would have to recognize the different communities in-
volved in disputes and the trade-offs between community inter-
ests at stake.  This Part ends by suggesting and evaluating some
of the conflict rules that might be used.
II. A FRESH LOOK AT THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Most discussions of fragmentation start by looking at its
results, working from there to try to discover ways to lessen its
impact or to mediate disputes.  They describe the symptoms
and manage their relief.  This Article takes a different tack.  It
starts by exploring the concept and the sources of interna-
tional law in an effort to find the root causes of fragmentation.
The hope is that in finding the root cause we will better be
able to diagnose the disease.
A. Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources
Given the constant conflicts over almost every aspect of
international law, the doctrine of sources’ stability over the
past hundred years is nothing short of remarkable.  The list of
sources—treaties, custom, and general principles—catalogued
by Lassa Oppenheim in his 1905 treatise15 and eventually codi-
fied in the statutes of the Permanent Court of International
Justice16 and its successor the International Court of Justice
(arguing that “the specialized institutions should continue to make and en-
force their specialized law, but in doing so they should also take account of
general international law and the law made in other institutions,” and con-
cluding that “[i]f all fora were to follow this approach, fragmentation and
unity of international law could go hand in hand and, when it comes to law-
enforcement, conflicting rulings could largely be avoided”); Martinez, supra
note 3, at 449–53; cf. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger of Fragmentation or Unifi- R
cation of the International Legal System and the International Court of Justice, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 791 (1999) (considering a more robust role for the
ICJ in resolving disputes over international law).
15. LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 20–25 (2d ed.
1912).
16. Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice art. 38, Dec.
16, 1920, 6 L.N.T.S. 379.
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(ICJ),17 continues to serve as the focal point for discussions of
international law.  Students are taught to apply it,18 practicing
lawyers build their arguments around it, and scholars debate
its meaning.  Together with a series of other traditional rules
like pacta sunt sevanda or rules regarding treaty interpretation,
these rules form the generally agreed upon core of interna-
tional law doctrine.
The doctrine of sources plays a complex role in interna-
tional law.  It is at one time a purported description of the
rules followed by states, a rule of decision for international
courts, a catalogue of legitimate forms of international law-
making, and a theory of international legal legitimacy.  To
some, the doctrine of sources represents international law’s
“rule of recognition”19 or its “secondary rules”20 more gener-
ally.  To be sure, debates abound over the meaning of almost
every aspect of the doctrine—how much practice must one see
to find a rule of customary international law, what counts as
practice, whose practice matters, what are “general princi-
ples”—but even in those debates the overall authoritativeness
of the doctrine goes unquestioned.
Given the centrality of the doctrine, it might seem strange
or presumptuous to question it here.  But in reality, the doc-
trine’s authority rests on very thin ice.  There are serious rea-
17. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1, June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, T.S. No. 993.
18. See, e.g., LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 56–57 (4th ed. 2001) (presenting the statute as a starting point of
instruction in an International Law casebook); MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E.
NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 20–21 (2d ed. 2001)
(“An ordinary starting point for international lawyers from most any part of
the globe when thinking about the formal sources of international law is
Article 38 of the International Court of Justice.”); HENRY J. STEINER ET AL.,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS: MATERIALS AND TEXT 232 (4th ed. 1994)
(quoting the statute and commenting that “[t]his list has significance not
only for tribunals but also for officials or scholars pursuing the inquiries de-
scribed above”).
19. Hiram E. Chodosh, Comparing Comparisons: In Search of Methodology, 84
IOWA L. REV. 1025, 1072 n.208 (1999) (“Article 38 contains the functional
equivalent of rules of recognition recognized by Hart to be indispensable to
any legal system.”).
20. See, e.g., Niels Petersen, Customary Law Without Custom? Rules, Princi-
ples, and the Role of State Practice in International Norm Creation, 23 AM. U. INT’L
L. REV. 275, 299 (2008) (“The secondary rules of the international legal or-
der would thus be the sources doctrine.”).
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1058 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 44:1049
sons to doubt the continued accuracy of the traditional doc-
trine.  Unlike a constitution, which might reflect an initial
commitment to certain lawmaking rules and serve as the au-
thority for later laws in a particular system, the doctrine of
sources did not predate international law and is not the au-
thority on which international lawmaking rests.  Instead it is a
description, a snapshot of how international law appeared to
function at a particular moment in time, in this case, the turn
of the twentieth century.  Much about both the world and in-
ternational law has changed since then, and the continued ac-
curacy of that picture cannot be assumed.
Of course, all of this is academic if contemporary interna-
tional law actually looks like the description in article 38 of the
ICJ Statute.  Supporters of traditional doctrine would likely ar-
gue that international practice has coalesced around the
sources, processes, and theories implicit or explicit in the doc-
trine of sources.  Right or wrong at its inception, they might
argue, the doctrine has created reasonable expectations of
what the law is and imbued the international laws made
through its processes with a high degree of legitimacy.  But
this does not appear to be the case.21  Changes in the interna-
tional system and international legal theory have put enor-
mous pressure on the doctrine.  The massive influx of new
states into the system has put enormous pressure on the gener-
alized consent envisioned by the doctrine’s description of cus-
tomary international law.  Retaining the doctrine has required
watering down notions of “general practice” and implied con-
sent almost to a nullity.22  While one might reasonably have
looked for the state practice of the handful of European and
other “civilized” states listed by Oppenheim, looking at the
practice of two hundred seems impractical if not impossible.
Similarly, consent of the new states to the already existing
rules has had to be assumed or imagined, lest those rules im-
mediately be called into doubt.
Scholars and practitioners have similarly struggled to rec-
oncile the individual rights orientation of human rights law
21. I make a fuller case in favor of rethinking the doctrine of sources in
Cohen, supra note 8. R
22. Cf. Curtis A. Bradley & G. Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International
Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202 (2010) (arguing that a fuller notion of unilateral
intent and disregard of custom can be found in the history).
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with the state-centric list of sources and to explain how cus-
tomary human rights law prohibiting practices like torture can
be reconciled with significant state practice to the contrary.23
Rapidly developing norms in human rights,24 environmental
law,25 and international criminal law26 put pressure on a
description of custom that seems to require slow develop-
ment.27  New phenomena—non-binding but authoritative
statements of international organizations, agreements between
sub-state units or actors, and the increasingly law-like nature of
rules adopted within corporate and NGO communities—are
stuffed into old doctrinal boxes; when they simply can’t fit,
they are defined out of international law.  And it is difficult to
locate well-accepted notions of jus cogens and non-derogable
norms in the doctrine or to reconcile their existence with the
doctrine’s model of laws made through state consent.28
All these pressures on the doctrinal strength of the doc-
trine of sources have been mounting at a time when interna-
tional legal theory seems to be moving away from the state-
consent-centric explanations of international law and away
from formal, top-down sources like treaty and custom.  In-
creasingly trying to understand when and how states come to
comply with international law, theorists have increasingly es-
chewed analysis of formal legal rules, instead looking at dy-
namic processes of norm transfer or behavior shaping.  Ignor-
ing questions about state consent, these theorists and research-
ers instead look to other mechanisms—how embeddedness in
international regimes can encourage cooperation between
23. Roberts, supra note 6, at 764. R
24. Id. at 762.
25. DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW 191–204 (2010).
26. Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, The Pluralism of International Criminal
Law, 86 IND. L. J. 1063 (2011).
27. Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 115, 157–59 (2005); Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State
Practice in a Divided World, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 513 (R. St. J. Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983).
28. See Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens,
34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 340 (2009) (“When pressed, however, positivists
struggle to reconcile this custom-based theory of jus cogens with actual state
practice.”).
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states,29 how states and state officials come to be socialized into
a world community that emphasizes certain types of behav-
ior,30 how transnational activist communities build cross-state
networks to push states to agree to and follow certain rules,31
how international law rules come to be internalized, shaped,
and enforced by domestic actors,32 or how international rules
are transferred between international networks of officials, bu-
reaucrats, and judges.33  Rather than focusing solely on states,
these theorists increasingly look at the juris-generative activi-
ties of other actors—bureaucrats, judges, activists, interest
groups, NGOs, corporations, and civilians.34
Thus from both a practical and theoretical standpoint, it
seems that a fresh look at the sources of international law is in
order.  But what would such a fresh look comprise?  A good
place to start is to look at various theories that have arisen to
answer other questions about international law, including the-
ories regarding compliance, theories designed to explain non-
technically legal phenomena like “soft law,” and theories de-
signed to explain norm conflict across regimes like global legal
pluralism.  Each holds hints at what actually counts as law in
the international system—ingredients for a new doctrine of
sources.  There are, of course, dangers in transplanting obser-
vations from these theories to a theory of sources.  One, for
example, should not equate when states comply with what
rules count as law.  But looked at carefully, these alternative
theories can begin to illuminate the mechanisms through
which rules come to be seen as law at all.
Many of these theories focus on the ways in which norms
are transferred across the international system and internal-
ized by states and other actors.  Others of these theories focus
on when particular rules will be seen as more legitimate.  In a
29. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995).
30. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004).
31. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).
32. Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International
Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1998).
33. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
34. See supra notes 29–33. R
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prior article,35 I looked specifically at two such theories, Har-
old Koh’s Transnational Legal Process36 and Thomas Franck’s
Law as Legitimacy.37  I argued that read together, the two the-
ories suggested that international rules come to be treated as
law in one of two ways.  First, some rules will be directly inter-
nalized by international actors.  Although some of these rules
will be substantive—states may internalize a prohibition on ge-
nocide or slavery, others which we might term “legitimacy
rules,” will focus more on process—they may explain what
counts as a binding agreement, what evidence is needed to le-
gitimate a customary practice as law, or dictate when such an
agreement must be followed.  Such legitimacy rules would in-
clude a combination of “process rules”—rules articulating the
process that must be followed to enact or change rules, and
“process values”—qualities rules must meet in order to be le-
gitimate law.38  Essentially these internalized legitimacy rules
provide standards against which purported rules of interna-
tional law will be judged.
A second category of rules treated as international law,
“legitimated rules,” builds on this first one.  Rules in this cate-
gory are treated as law because they meet the standard of inter-
nalized legitimacy rules.  Thus, as an example, some human
rights may be treated as international law because those rights
have simply been internalized, while others may be treated as
35. Cohen, supra note 8. R
36. Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?,
74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1999); Koh, supra note 32. R
37. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITU-
TIONS (1995); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NA-
TIONS (1990); Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM.
J. INT’L L. 705 (1988).
38. In my prior article, I argued that these process values might include
qualities like determinacy, pedigree, coherence, and adherence that Franck
has identified as factors leading to “legitimacy pull.”  Cohen, supra note 8, at R
112–13.  Such process values may also include factors associated with Lon
Fuller’s internal morality of the law. See JUTTA BRUNNE´E & STEPHEN J. TOOPE,
LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL AC-
COUNT 25–26 (2010); Benedict Kingsbury, International Law as Inter-Public
Law, in NOMOS XLIX: MORAL UNIVERSALISM AND PLURALISM 167, 176
(Henry S. Richardson & Melissa S. Williams eds., 2009) [hereinafter Kings-
bury, International Law as Inter-Public Law].
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international law because they’re embodied in a document
that meets internalized standards of legitimacy.39
Under the traditional doctrine of sources, the test applied
to any purported international law rule is a formal one—is it a
treaty, a custom, or a general principle of law?  A revised doc-
trine of sources suggests a much more functional test.  For any
given purported international law rule, the question will be
two-fold.  First, has the rule itself been internalized/do actors
treat the rule as in itself legally binding?40  Second, if not, has
the rule been adopted through legitimate processes?
As I have explained in much greater depth elsewhere,41
such a reconceptualization has the advantages of more accu-
rately capturing international practice, better capturing the
ways theory tells us rules come to be accepted as law, eliminat-
ing clumsy boundaries between treaty, custom, and other po-
tential sources, and recognizing the dynamic nature of legal
rules, i.e., that the legal status of rules can change over time,
regardless of the form (treaty, custom, or something else) they
take.  Even legitimacy rules can change over time.  This recon-
ceptualization also dovetails well with various broader theories
of law, in particular, that of H.L.A Hart.42  By looking beyond
the formal sources of Article 38, it echoes Hart’s sociological
approach to law.  The question both here and for Hart is
which rules are treated as law as a matter of social fact.43  By
focusing on the internalization of norms, both substantive and
procedural, this revised doctrine echoes Hart’s emphasis on
the internal point of view—the requirement of law that it be
accepted as an obligation, not merely imposed by coercion.44
39. Importantly, these need not be one-or-the-other choices:  Some states
may treat a rule (e.g., prohibiting certain acts in war) as law because the rule
itself has been internalized while other states (which have not yet internal-
ized the rule) may treat the rule as law because it is embodied in a treaty
adopted through a legitimate process (e.g., the Geneva Conventions).  The
two categories are fluid:  A rule not yet fully internalized might be given
extra legitimacy by process, and a rule initially treated as law because it was
created through a legitimate process, may over time be internalized.
40. Or, in other words, is there opinio juris?
41. Cohen, supra note 8. R
42. HART, supra note 9. R
43. Id. at 225–26.
44. Id. at 79–99.  This also echoes observations of legal pluralists, see
Berman, Pluralist Approach, supra note 11, at 323, and socio-legal positivism, R
see generally Brian Z. Tamanaha, Socio-Legal Positivism and a General Jurispru-
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But most of all, the relationship described in the revised doc-
trine between legitimacy rules and the rules adopted in accor-
dance with them comes very close to Hart’s description of pri-
mary and secondary rules.45  Legitimacy rules play a similar
role to Hart’s secondary rules, defining when a rule will be
treated as law in the system.  The main difference is that legiti-
macy rules capture not only the processes to be followed or
the sources to be looked at, but the normative justifications for
those choices as well.46
B. Rethinking the International Community
A full discussion and defense of how such revised doctrine
would be applied is beyond the scope of this Article and some-
thing I have written about at length in a previous article.47
The question here is whether such a revised doctrine can shed
light on the problem of normative conflict between subject ar-
eas of international law—a problem often attributed to the
fragmentation of international law.
dence, 21 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2001) (adapting legal positivism to incor-
porate a wider variety of social practices into the concept of law).
45. This might appear ironic as Hart describes international law as primi-
tive law on the basis of his perception that it lacked secondary rules. HART,
supra note 9, at 214. R
46. Despite the surface similarity between the concept of secondary rules
as used by Hart and legitimacy rules used here, I have specifically chosen not
to use the former term.  Secondary rules only refer to the function the rules
play in the system, not to the normative account underlying them—some-
thing legitimacy rules are meant to capture.  Further, the two concepts do
not completely overlap:  some procedural or adjudicatory rules which would
count as secondary rules under Hart’s formulation might not be internalized
legitimacy rules, but instead rules adopted through a legitimate process
themselves—take, for example, treaty provisions on dispute resolution
under that treaty regime.  (Similarly, some rules that might be seen as pri-
mary rules under Hart’s formulation may actually be directly internalized
and not dependent on any other rule for their treatment as law.)  Finally,
the term “secondary rules” is already in use in international law, often to
describe rules laid out in the traditional doctrine of sources. See, e.g., DIVER-
SITY IN SECONDARY RULES AND THE UNITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9–10
(L.A.N.M. Barnhoorn and K.C. Wellens eds., 1995) (associating Hart’s “rules
of recognition” with Art. 38 and associated international law doctrines); Pe-
tersen, supra note 20, at 299 (“The secondary rules of the international legal R
order would thus be the sources doctrine.”).  Avoiding confusion seems to
require a different term.
47. Cohen, supra note 8. R
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One of the questions raised but not answered in my ear-
lier discussion of sources is who needs to internalize the rules
upon which international law is based.  I did suggest that the
who could change over time and that the current legal commu-
nity of international law may include actors other than just
states and their agents.48  This question is not unique to a re-
vised doctrine of sources; similar questions have come up, for
example in the context of whose opinio juris should count in
looking for customary international law.49  Much of the time,
the answer is a bit fudged.50  But the question takes on added
importance under a revised doctrine of sources.  To the extent
we need to look for the legitimacy rules of the system, we need
to know who has a say in what counts as legitimate, who gets to
judge the legitimacy of a particular rule.
Moreover, we have so far assumed that there is a single
international law community with a single set of legitimacy
rules.  However, once the focus shifts away from form and to a
search for shared internalized rules, it becomes completely
plausible that one might find different communities with dif-
ferent internalized rules.51  As legal pluralists have long ob-
served, “people belong to (or feel affiliated with) multiple
groups and understand themselves to be bound by the norms
of these multiple groups.”52  Legal communities can often
overlap, as they did in colonial societies where colonial and
indigenous law often lived side-by-side, vying for control.
These observations have been applied to a wide range of nor-
mative communities—the state, religion, business communi-
48. Id. at 113–14.
49. See Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law
Formation, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 172–73 (2007) (analyzing whether individu-
als have a role to play in providing evidence of customary international law).
50. Id. at 150 (“Missing throughout this foundational literature is both a
theoretical underpinning for the proposition that individuals should be rec-
ognized in CIL formation doctrine and a thorough consideration of how this
might be accomplished, both doctrinally and in practice.”).
51. See Berman, Pluralist Approach, supra note 11, at 323 (“Such differen- R
tiations are less consequential in a pluralism context because the relevant
question is the normative commitments of communities, not the formal sta-
tus of those commitments. If, after all, a statement of norms is slowly inter-
nalized by a population, that statement will have important binding force,
often even more so than a formal law backed by state sanction.”).
52. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 10, at 1169. R
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ties, and even transnational regulation.53  There is no reason
to think that these observations could not be applied to inter-
national law as well.54  In that context, it could mean different
overlapping communities of states, e.g., European states or
maritime states, but it could also mean subject-specific com-
munities that include actors other than states, e.g., regulators,
NGOs, individuals, and corporations.  Depending on where we
look, depending on the actors we focus on, we may find differ-
ent internalized legitimacy rules.  As a result, we must ask not
only what the internalized legitimacy rules are but also who
makes up the relevant community.55
This is no easy task.  For one thing, we need a better un-
derstanding of what it is we look for when we talk about “com-
munity” in this context.  The term community is vague and
over-used; it seems deeply weighted with meaning yet utterly
abstract.  What do we actually mean when we talk about rele-
vant legal communities in this context?  One helpful conceptu-
alization can be found in the constructivist international rela-
tions literature, in particular, Emanuel Adler’s “communities
of practice.”56  As Adler explains, “[c]ommunities of practice
‘consist of people who are informally as well as contextually
bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a com-
mon practice.’”57  Such a common practice, “in turn, [is] sus-
tained by a repertoire of communal resources, such as routines,
words, tools, ways of doing things, stories, symbols, and dis-
53. See generally id.
54. At times, Berman seems to suggest as such, but most of the examples
he looks at are between international law and other competitors, such as
state law, regional law, and transnational regulatory regimes.
55. Cf. Berman, Pluralist Approach, supra note 11, at 323 (“As a result, in- R
stead of focusing solely on who has the formal authority to articulate norms
or the coercive power to enforce them, we can turn the gaze to an empirical
study of which statements of authority tend to be treated as binding in actual
practice and by whom.”) (emphasis removed).
56. EMANUEL ADLER, COMMUNITARIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE EP-
ISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2005).  Thank you to
Jutta Brune´e for pointing me to Adler’s work.
57. Id. at 15 (quoting William M. Snyder, Communities of Practice: Combin-
ing Organizational Learning and Strategy Insights to Create a Bridge to the 21st
Century, COMMUNITY INTELLIGENCE LABS (Aug. 1997), http://www.co-i-l.com/
coil/knowledge-garden/cop/cols.shtml).  Adler himself borrows the idea of
communities of practice from the work of Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger on
education and learning theory. Id. at 15 n.116.
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course.”58  One key in this description of community is that it
does not require members to agree on everything—members
may disagree sharply on substance and desired outcomes; in-
stead, it requires only that members accept a set of common
ground-rules for negotiation and contestation.  Communities
of practice can come in various shapes and sizes; their bounda-
ries “are determined by people’s knowledge and identity and
the discourse associated with a specific practice.”59  Some com-
munities will be tightly organized, with small groups of practi-
tioners who know each other well and engage with each other
regularly on a defined set of issues.60  Others will be much
more diffuse, with members who never meet and are con-
nected only by their shared practices—practices they apply to
a broad range of activities.61  Members may also have different
relations to these communities.  Some may be core members
who actively work to develop its rules and norms, while others,
farther from the core of the community of practice, may sim-
ply adopt, accept, or apply the results of that work.62
58. Id. at 15.
59. Id. at 24.
60. Adler gives the example of U.N. weapons inspectors. Id. at 25.
61. Here, Adler uses the collective security community as an example.
Id. at 24–25.
62. “Communities of practice may be viewed as being composed of three
concentric circles.” Id. at 24.  As Adler explains:
Practices are brought into existence in the first or inner circle.  For
example, a look at cooperative security and the role of the Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in the evolu-
tion of this practice shows that the Helsinki Final Act and subse-
quent normative injunctions and practices, such as CBMs, were de-
veloped in the inner circle of CSCE practitioners.  In an
intermediate circle we find people, who, due to expertise or nor-
mative commitment, help diffuse the practice.  This would include
CSCE experts, the Helsinki Human Rights groups, and European
political leaders, who assimilated cooperative practices, diffused
them more widely, and brought them to their respective domestic
systems.  The outer circle is made up of those experts, practition-
ers, and activists who adopt and help implement such practices be-
yond their original functional or geographic boundaries.  In our
case, that includes people from the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) or Barcelona Pro-
cess.
Id. at 24–25.
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Adler’s description of common practice seems to capture
law and legal discourse well, and legal communities, as Jutta
Brunne´e and Stephen Toope have observed,63 look like partic-
ularly good examples of communities of practice.  Law pro-
vides a medium for debate and agreement, requiring actors to
engage with each other in very specific fora using very specific
language and procedures.  The legal community, in turn, is
constituted by its members’ shared acceptance of certain
ground rules and their shared expectations about good and
bad arguments. As Adler observes, “[i]t is as members of com-
munities of practice that people exercise one of the highest
forms of power: determining the meanings and discourses that
produce social practices.”64  The proposed structure of com-
munities of practice, with concentric circles of core experts/
practitioners and more peripheral adopters, helps conceptual-
ize the relationship in a legal community between the expert
lawyers who practice the law and the broader community of
stakeholders whose influence and involvement are weaker, but
whose broad acquiescence is still necessary.
Applied at the international level, such insights can begin
to explain international actors, and in turn, the practice of in-
ternational law.  “The closer we get to the level of practice, in
fact, the more we can take the international system as a collec-
tion of communities of practice; for example communities of
diplomats, of traders, of environmentalists, and of human-
rights activists.”65  Conceptualizing community this way also
fits well with the process orientation of the alternative doctrine
of sources described above, capturing the way rules come to be
internalized by legal actors through legal practice.
Still, even if this helps in describing the sorts of communi-
ties in which law and legitimacy rules form, the exact shape of
such communities seems nearly impossible to discover.66
63. See generally JUTTA BRUNNE´E & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LE-
GALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT 13–16, 28
(2010).
64. ADLER, supra note 56, at 25; cf. Kenneth Anderson, The Rise of Interna- R
tional Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended Consequences, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L.
331, 349 (2009) (discussing “communities of interpretation and authority”).
65. ADLER, supra note 56, at 15. R
66. Cf. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 10, at 1171 (“Of course, R
finding non-state forms of normative ordering is sometimes more difficult
outside the colonial context because there is no obvious indigenous system,
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Their overlapping nature, their ever-evolving membership,
and the fact that actors can be members of multiple (even con-
flicting) communities at the same time, makes drawing bound-
aries around them a hopeless task.  What is important to focus
on here though are the very limited purposes for which the
term is being used.  Drawing certain empirical observations
about the nature of rules in the system may not require a per-
fect description of the community.67  Even a rough approxi-
mation may still allow us to see developing norms of legiti-
macy.  And in this case, the link between communities and le-
gitimacy rules may provide the key.
Legitimacy rules might be seen as the most basic of com-
mon practices necessary for a legal community of practice.
Just as the membership of a particular community might sug-
gest certain legitimacy rules, so too might the presence of cer-
tain legitimacy rules suggest in a very rough way the outlines of
the community that shares them.68  We might adopt a func-
tional definition of the legal community as that group of ac-
tors whose judgment of a rule’s legitimacy is necessary for the
rule to act effectively as law.69  In other words, the community
is that set of actors who can effectively assert claims regarding
the legitimacy rules of the system.70  This very specific notion
and the less formal ordering structures tend to ‘blend more readily into the
landscape.’”) (citing Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV.
869, 873 (1988)).
67. We might not need to know, for example, an exact list of members,
clear criteria for membership, or who patrols the communities’ boundaries,
all problematic questions on which other discussions of community often
founder.  Of course, if we were to transform the legitimacy communities into
a legal category or give them doctrinal significance, such question would
take on new importance. See infra Part IV.B.
68. As Adler explains, “The negotiations about meaning that occur
within and between communities of practice eventually define the communi-
ties’ boundaries.” ADLER, supra note 56, at 27. R
69. This dovetails well with Hart, who identified “efficacy” as a key ele-
ment of law, and Fuller, who lists “congruence” among his factors of law’s
internal morality. HART, supra note 9, at 103–04; LON L. FULLER, THE MO- R
RALITY OF LAW 81 (1961).  On both accounts, it makes sense to link effective-
ness with other indicia of legitimacy.  This is not so much circular as it is a
demonstration of how the legal system works:  Rules will be effective among
the group that judges them legitimate.  Importantly, as an aside, effective-
ness is not the same as compliance. See Franck, supra note 37, at 706–12; R
Cohen, supra note 8, at 106–07. R
70. Cf. supra text accompanying note 68. R
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of a “legitimacy community” dovetails well with the functional
doctrine of sources described above, which focuses on inter-
nalized legitimacy rules and rules adopted pursuant to them.
The traditional doctrine of sources provides a good exam-
ple of how such an analysis would work.  The list of sources in
Article 38 arguably describes the processes of legitimate law-
making and the standards of legitimacy in a community of sov-
ereign states (the paradigmatic international law community
of the early twentieth century).  States (or really, their agents)
would recognize law made through explicit treaties or prac-
tices sufficiently widespread and longstanding to be thought of
as obligatory.71  The standard against which the legitimacy of
laws appears to be measured in this community is state con-
sent—either explicit in the case of treaties, or implicit in the
case of custom.  Additional rules like the persistent objector
exception further emphasize the importance of state consent.
The question remains whether these legitimacy rules can best
describe contemporary international law and its specific sub-
fields, a question that will be taken up by the next part.
III. NO LONGER UGLY DUCKLINGS: APPLYING THE REVISED
DOCTRINE OF SOURCES
Under the revised doctrine set out above, what counts as
law internationally is a function of what a particular interna-
tional community accepts as legitimate lawmaking.  The corol-
lary to that observation is that an international legal commu-
nity is defined by the rules of legitimate lawmaking that it
shares.  This suggests two somewhat radical possibilities:  First,
that in various areas of international law the legitimate sources
of law may no longer be those listed in article 38 of the ICJ
statute, and second, that disagreements over the legitimacy of
particular sources may mean that international law is no
longer defined by a single legal community.
71. General principles are harder to describe because they are harder to
define.  General principles might simply have been gap-filling rules for inter-
national tribunals, which states had accepted as legitimate for those pur-
poses.  Or they could be sources of legal obligation in their own right, in
which case the argument would be that states accepted the legitimacy of
rules derived from municipal practice when those practices were sufficiently
common to states in the community.
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This section applies these lessons to three areas that have
put pressure on traditional sources doctrine:  (1) international
human rights law, (2) tribunal law (i.e., the law applied in ar-
eas of international law dominated by adjudication or arbitra-
tion), and (3) Global Administrative Law.  It takes a fresh look
at some of the doctrinal difficulties these areas have produced
and explores whether evolving communities and changing le-
gitimacy rules may be able to explain them.  It asks whether a
revised doctrine of sources can bring clarity to practices in
those areas that the traditional doctrine only obscured.
Finding the hidden legitimacy rules in an area of law is an
undoubtedly difficult task.  Because the traditional doctrine of
sources is still perceived to be at the core of international prac-
tice and adjudication, actors strain to make their arguments in
the language of the doctrine of sources.  Figuring out what is
really going on is thus probably impossible.  The point here is
not to catalogue the hidden legitimacy rules in each area, but
instead merely to show that something appears hidden, that
traditional arguments may be mere masks disguising the real
concerns within a particular community.
A. Human Rights
Human rights might be thought of as international law’s
problem child.  Human rights law constantly challenges tradi-
tional international law doctrine.  Many of the most persistent
challenges to the traditional doctrine of sources have come
from human rights bodies, experts, advocates, and scholars.
Three particular challenges stand out:  (1) the possibility of
“instant custom,” or custom based on little or no state practice,
(2) the relevance of various non-traditional sources to the
search for custom, and (3) the treatment of reservations and
other attempts to limit the effects of treaties.
The question of how much state practice, practiced for
how long, is necessary before a rule can properly be called cus-
tomary international law is a well-worn one in international
law.  Claims that little or no state practice may suffice are not
exclusive to human rights; in fact, they had their origins in
other areas.72  But these questions have become central with
72. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 ¶¶ 186–202 (June 27) (minimizing the impor-
tance of instances of state practice and focusing almost entirely on tradi-
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regard to human rights.  In human rights law, it is common to
find arguments, as well as decisions by international bodies,
suggesting rules of customary international law even in the
face of widespread state practice to the contrary.  Torture is
the most widely cited example.  It is also common to see argu-
ments that custom can emerge very quickly, almost instantane-
ously, following the widespread ratification of multilateral
human rights treaties or a series of declarations from the
United Nations General Assembly or other international bod-
ies.  Scholars, advocates, and judges have all argued explicitly
or implicitly that what matters most with regard to human
rights law is what states say their obligations are—traditional
evidence of opinio juris.73  It is through this change in emphasis
that human rights law has recognized a broad range of rights
and rules that states continue to violate and which other states
do little to stop.
Such views seem to be in tension with traditional interna-
tional law doctrine.  As Onuma Yasuaki has observed, “The
term [instant custom] itself is, of course, a contradiction.”74
Custom by its nature implies some reasonably widespread, rea-
sonably longstanding state practice.  As Anthea Roberts has ex-
plained, traditional custom “focuses primarily on state practice
in the form of interstate interaction and acquiescence. Opinio
juris is a secondary consideration invoked to distinguish be-
tween legal and nonlegal obligations.”75
But the conflicts over custom do not end there.  Another
major point of disagreement is over the proper sources of ei-
ther state practice or opinio juris.  Scholars, advocates, and
judges operating on the field of human rights have expanded
the notion of state practice to include state statements, includ-
tional sources of opinio juris to find customary international law); North Sea
Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 20)
(recognizing the possibility that even rare state practice may support finding
customary international law); Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer
Space: “Instant” International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 23 (1965)
(arguing that state practice simply serves as evidence of opinio juris in identi-
fying customary international law).
73. See Roberts, supra note 6, at 758. R
74. Onuma Yasuaki, Is the International Court of Justice an Emperor Without
Clothes?, 8 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 1, 22 (2002).  Onuma adds that the term
“clearly reveals how inappropriate and outdated it is to think of general in-
ternational law within the framework of Article 38.” Id.
75. Roberts, supra note 6, at 758. R
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ing votes for General Assembly resolutions, and have mined
new sources of opinio juris, in particular, the opinions of na-
tional courts.76  The use of the latter seems particularly ques-
tionable from the perspective of the traditional doctrine of
sources.  First, states are traditionally the legal actors in the
system and it is their opinion on whether a rule is legally bind-
ing that matters.  It is unclear that domestic courts are really
reflective of that view (unless of course, they hinge their deci-
sion on the perceived position of their state); they certainly
aren’t acting as agents of the state.77  Second, even if the deci-
sions of national courts evidence a belief by those courts that a
particular rule is legally binding, under traditional doctrine,
one would have to be very careful that the court was speaking
of international obligation—that the rule was binding between
states—rather than merely of domestic obligation—that the
rule was binding under the state’s constitution.
Human rights law also poses challenges to treaty law.
Under traditional doctrine, states are only bound by treaty
provisions that they agree to.78  Accordingly, when a state adds
a reservation to a treaty, it will not be bound by the reserved
provision.  Either its counterparty states fail to object and the
reserving state is bound by only those provisions that it has
agreed to, or its counterparties object, in which case, if there’s
no further agreement, there is no treaty at all.  This rule fol-
lows the general legitimating norm underlying traditional doc-
76. Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of Interna-
tional Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 213, 230 (2003); Mary Ann Torres, The
Human Right to Health, National Courts, and Access to HIV/AIDS Treatment: A
Case Study from Venezuela, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 105, 109 (2002); Onuma, supra
note 74, at 19. (“Actually, most of these ‘customary’ norms have been pos- R
ited by leading international lawyers in their treatises or textbooks.  These
international lawyers relied heavily on the acts and statements of the execu-
tive branch of the government, domestic laws, and domestic court decisions
as major materials of state practice.  Basically, the same materials have been
used as evidence of opinio juris.”).
77. See generally Philip M. Moreman, National Court Decisions as State Prac-
tice: A Transnational Judicial Dialogue, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 259, 264
(2006) (arguing  that national court decisions can be a deceptive indication
of state practice given inconsistencies between national court decisions and
practice of other state organs).
78. Reservations to the Convention on the Punishment and Prevention
of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 21 (May 28) (“It
is well established that in its treaty relations a State cannot be bound without
its consent . . . .”).
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trine—state consent. Multilateral treaties, however, make
things more complex.  Questions arise about the effect of res-
ervations where some, but not all parties to the treaty object.
In its advisory opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Con-
vention, the ICJ held that the treaty would not be in force be-
tween a reserving state and any state that objected to the reser-
vation, but would be in force—minus the reserved provision—
between the reserving state and non-objecting states.79
But these rules have been challenged with regard to
human rights treaties.  Arguments have been made that states
should simply not be allowed to include reservations that vio-
late the objects and purposes of the treaty.  Taking the argu-
ment one step further, the Human Rights Committee, a body
of experts established under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, has asserted that it is it, and not the
other state parties, who should determine whether a reserva-
tion invalidly violates the Covenant’s objects and purposes.
Describing the acceptance or rejection of reservations as an
“inappropriate task for States parties in relation to human
rights treaties,” the Committee explained that “[i]t necessarily
falls to the Committee to determine whether a specific reserva-
tion is compatible with the object and purpose of the Cove-
nant.”80  “Because of the special character of a human rights
treaty, the compatibility of a reservation with the object and
purpose of the Covenant must be established objectively, by
reference to legal principles, and the Committee is particularly
well placed to perform this task.”81  In a direct challenge to
traditional doctrine’s reliance on state consent, the Commit-
tee went one step further, announcing that an invalid “reserva-
tion will generally be severable” and that accordingly, states
who attempt an invalid reservation will be held bound to the
entire treaty including the part they sought to reserve.”82  This
79. Id. at 26.
80. U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 24:
Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the
Covenants or the Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under
Article 41 of the Covenant, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov.
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assault on state consent is echoed in the Committee’s rejection
of the right of withdrawal from the Covenant.83
All three of these challenges are serious, raising questions
that go to the very core of international law.  Nonetheless, they
are generally treated as doctrinal or technical challenges.
What is the correct interpretation of article 38’s requirements
of general practice and opinio juris?  How should reservations
work in a multilateral context?  The question is who has the
doctrinally correct position or whether the two positions can
be reconciled in some way.84
But the differences between human rights and other areas
of international law seem to run deeper than that, and the
revised doctrine of sources above suggests a different explana-
tion.  Each difference seems to cut to the heart of what makes
international law legitimate at all.  They suggest that a separate
legal subcommunity is forming in human rights, one that has
very different understanding of legitimate rulemaking than
the traditional state-only community.85
There are strong reasons to think that human rights law is
no longer judged by a community made up solely of states.
First, by creating laws deliberately designed to intercede be-
tween states and their populations, to limit what states can do
to their own peoples, states have necessarily given up their mo-
nopoly over the shape of human rights law.  Human rights law
limits states; it cannot be that whatever states do is the law.
Moreover, human rights law simply isn’t state-to-state law.  As I
have argued elsewhere, human rights treaties are specifically
designed to avoid relying on state-to-state enforcement.86  In-
83. U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 26:
Continuity of Obligations, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1
(Dec. 8, 1997), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/453883f
de.html.
84. See generally Roberts, supra note 6 (proposing a theory that can recon- R
cile “modern” and “traditional” custom and describing prior attempts by
other scholars).
85. For a similar argument that disagreements over human rights law ac-
tually represent differences regarding governing secondary rules, see
Monica Hakimi, Secondary Human Rights Law, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 596 (2009).
86. State-to-state enforcement arguably would not be effective.  Harlan
Grant Cohen, Can International Law Work? A Constructivist Expansion, 27
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 636, 656 (2009) (“Human rights advocates seem well
aware of the weaknesses of state-to-state enforcement in that area. As a re-
sult, human rights treaties have increasingly adopted mechanisms specifi-
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stead they are consciously designed to reach inside states, to
empower individuals and populations, and to provide a focal
point for national and transnational advocacy.87  In some
cases, human rights law goes even farther, giving individuals
direct access to international institutions.  The result is that
states simply cannot control the arguments made about the
law and cannot control the law’s eventual shape and direction.
In essence, in human rights, states have (perhaps reluctantly)
invited others into the international legal community.
To put it in community of practice terms, the community
of human rights law now seems to include individuals in direct
and indirect ways, sometimes as active practitioners and some-
times as passive participants.  A small, but increasing, number
of individuals who participate directly by pursuing their own
human rights claims are joined by NGOs, human rights activ-
ists, and experts who claim to represent the interests of indi-
viduals.  Pressing their claims in various formal and informal
fora, both groups have begun to shape broader popular views
and expectations on what human rights require and how they
work.88
The recognition that states are no longer the sole mem-
bers of the relevant community can be found in both the
Human Rights Committee’s general comment regarding the
right of states to withdraw from the convention89 and the In-
ter-American Commission’s discussion of its jurisdiction over
cally directed as transnational advocacy groups, domestic constituencies, and
individual claimants.”).
87. See generally BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTER-
NATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009) (arguing that human rights are
most effective in states with active civil societies and institutions).
88. In discussing related issues regarding the laws of war, Kenneth An-
derson lists:
NGOs; the Security Council; other organs of the United Nations
such as the Human Rights Council and its dependencies such as
certain special rapporteurs; the activist-scholars who make up what
we may call the ‘visible college’ of international law; public intellec-
tuals of several fields, through books, journals, and the media; na-
tional or regional courts, not specialized as such in law of armed
conflict but called upon to interpret it; and international criminal
tribunals of all types, their staffs, and the staffs particularly of the
prosecutors’ offices.
Anderson, supra note 64, at 349–50. R
89. U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 26:
Continuity of Obligations, supra note 83. R
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human rights violations in Cuba.90  In both cases, the human
rights body explained that once a state ratified a treaty, its pro-
visions belong to the people.91  It doesn’t appear to be a far
leap to suggest that those people also have a say in assessing
the legitimacy of rules adopted.
As the membership of the community 92 of human rights
law changes, arguments within that community over its basic
norms—in particular its legitimacy rules—might be expected.
Although each of the doctrinal positions developing with
human rights remains controversial, they do suggest a consis-
tent, alternative vision of legal legitimacy within that commu-
nity.  In contrast to the traditional doctrine of sources’ focus
90. INTER-AM. COMM’ N H.R., 2006 Annual Report, ch. IV, ¶ 54 (Mar. 3,
2007) (“[I]t was not the intention of the Organization of American States to
leave the Cuban people without protection.  That Government’s exclusion
from the regional system in no way means that it is no longer bound by its
international human rights obligations.”) (citing INTER-AM. COMM’ N H.R.,
2002 ANNUAL REPORT, ch. IV, ¶ 7.a (Mar. 7, 2003)).
91. Id.  As the U.N. Human Rights Committee explained:
The rights enshrined in the Covenant belong to the people living
in the territory of the State party.  The Human Rights Committee
has consistently taken the view, as evidenced by its long-standing
practice, that once the people are accorded the protection of the
rights under the Covenant, such protection devolves with territory
and continues to belong to them, notwithstanding change in gov-
ernment of the State party, including dismemberment in more
than one State or State succession or any subsequent action of the
State party designed to divest them of the rights guaranteed by the
Covenant.
U.N. Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 26: Con-
tinuity of Obligations, supra note 83, ¶ 4. R
92. As mentioned above, it is notoriously difficult to define the exact
membership of these communities, and many of those who talk of juris-gen-
erative communities beyond the state choose to leave their membership
fuzzy. See Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PENN. L.
REV. 311, 478 (Dec. 2002) (explaining “that space and community affiliation
can never be ‘given’ and that the process of their sociopolitical construction
must always be considered”); Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 3, at R
1006 (“The primary motor for this development is an accelerated differenti-
ation of society into autonomous social systems, each of which springs terri-
torial confines and constitutes itself globally.”).  One might define member-
ship by who “makes” the law in an area, but such a definition requires a
further definition of what it means to “make” the law.  The functional defini-
tion of the legal community here, which may or may not be satisfying, is that
group of actors whose judgment of a rule’s legitimacy is necessary for the
rule to act effectively as law.
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on state action, this alternative vision seems to focus on state
promises.  Traditionally, state promises were meaningless if
not backed up by state action.  Hypocrisy could not create cus-
tom.  The new legitimacy rule emerging in human rights
seems to be that state promises matter and that the state can-
not vitiate those promises merely through state action to the
contrary. 93
Such a rule also seems to cut through distinctions be-
tween custom and treaty.  The exact form of a state promise is
less important than its solemnity and seriousness.  Human
rights treaties, votes on general assembly resolutions, non-
binding declarations like the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights or the Helsinki Final Accords are all publicly directed
promises to respect certain rights.  Such a rule clearly seems to
be operating with regard to “instant” custom and helps explain
the trend toward emphasizing traditional evidence of opinio
juris over state practice.  States simply cannot promise not to
torture and then keep the promise from being binding by
breaking their promises and torturing.  But it also might ex-
plain the Human Rights Committee’s views on reservations
and withdrawals.  In a sense, ratifying a human rights treaty
might be seen as a particularly public promise to respect the
rights therein.  Reservations, which are often either highly
technical or hard to interpret, might be seen as “sneaky” ways
that states try to avoid the full effects of those promises.  In
essence, reservations are like states crossing their fingers be-
hind their backs.  The Human Rights Committee seems unwill-
ing to accept such behavior.  The same could be said of the
Committee’s view of withdrawals.  Once a state makes a prom-
ise to its people through a human rights treaty, those people
become stakeholders in that treaty.  As members of the com-
munity, they must have some say in whether a state can relieve
itself of those obligations.
There are reasons to think that individuals and their advo-
cates, as new members of the community, might demand such
93. A similar argument could be made about the concept of “human dig-
nity” in human rights law.  “Human dignity” appears to be replacing “state
sovereignty” as the touchstone against which potential rules of international
human rights law are judged, suggesting that it too may be emerging as a
legitimacy rule within that community.  In other words, potential human
rights rules are increasingly judged legitimate or not based on how well they
uphold human dignity.
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rules.  For one thing, state promises, whether in the form of
resolutions, treaties, or something else, are often made for
public consumption and are often directed to the broader
public.  That individuals would want to hold states to these
promises is unsurprising.  Moreover, asking individuals to
weigh those statements against state actions or against compli-
cated state caveats like reservations may be unrealistic.  Indi-
viduals, unlike states, do not have the resources or expertise to
monitor states in that way.  They may demand a level of trans-
parency beyond what states demand amongst themselves.
Such concerns may also explain the reliance on new sources of
evidence.  The public resolutions of international bodies are
certainly more accessible to individuals than the specifics of
state practice, much of which may be purposely hidden from
view.  But court opinions can be seen in this way as well.  Court
opinions are much more transparent than state action.  Courts
also provide individuals with a forum to make arguments
about the law’s content, a means of holding states accountable
for their promises, and direct access to the law’s development.
None of this is meant to suggest that this view is uncontro-
verted, even within the human rights community.  That com-
munity is complex and along with scholars, advocates, and ex-
perts, it also includes states and their agents.  Although many
state actors may agree with the cosmopolitan drift in human
rights law, others may be quite sensitive and hostile to new le-
gitimacy rules that they cannot control.  This sensitivity is, of
course, heightened by traditional doctrine’s conception of a
unitary international legal order.  States may be legitimately
concerned that if new rules are recognized as valid doctrine in
human rights, nothing in traditional doctrine would keep
them from being recognized for other areas of international
law like international humanitarian law or trade.  This hesi-
tance, however, only highlights the tensions between the over-
lapping communities of international law.
B. Tribunal Law
The worst kept secret in international law is that interna-
tional tribunals rely on precedent.  Of course, the reason it’s
kept a secret at all is that under the traditional doctrine of
sources, prior decisions are only a subsidiary source of interna-
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tional law.94  They are not meant to take the place of other
sources, treaties, custom, or general principles, but merely to
serve as evidence of them.95  While complaints have been
lodged against the ICJ and other bodies for using precedent in
lieu of other more legitimate sources,96 such statements are
almost taken for granted in international criminal law and in-
vestment arbitration.97
94. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 17, art. R
38(1)(d).
95. See id. art. 59 (“The decision of the Court has no binding force ex-
cept between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”); see also
Martinez, supra note 3, at 482 (“[E]ven within a single international court R
there is often no system of binding precedent and no doctrine of stare deci-
sis.”) (emphasis omitted).
96. See, e.g., Zhu Lanye, The Effects of the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and
Appellate Body Reports: Is the Dispute Settlement Body Resolving Disputes Only or
Making Precedent at the Same Time?, 17 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 221, 230
(2003) (“If we regard precedents as decisions furnishing a basis for deter-
mining later cases involving similar facts or issues we can say without hesita-
tion that large amounts of such precedents exist in the WTO dispute settle-
ment system.”); Raj Bhala, The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade
Law (Part One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845, 850 (1999) (“In brief,
there is a body of international common law of trade emerging as a result of
adjudication by the WTO’s Appellate Body.  We have yet to recognize, much
less account for, this reality in our doctrinal thinking and discussions.”).
97. Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. Mexico, Award, ¶ 129 (NAFTA
Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Jan. 26, 2006), reprinted in 6 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE
L. 419, 571 (2006) (“In international and international economic law—to
which investment arbitration properly belongs—there may not be a formal
‘stare decisis’ rule as in common law countries, but precedent plays an im-
portant role.  Tribunals and courts may disagree and are at full liberty to
deviate from specific awards, but it is hard to maintain that they can and
should not respect well-established jurisprudence.”); Susan D. Franck, The
Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International
Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1611–12 (2005)
(“The fact is that investment awards are not technically precedential . . . . As
a practical matter, however, private investors, governments, and arbitral
tribunals rely on previous awards to interpret similar provisions in invest-
ment treaties.”); Matthew Belz, Comment, Provisional Application of the Energy
Charter Treaty: Karassopoulos v. Georgia and Improving Provisional Application
in Multilateral Treaties, 22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 727, 752 (2008) (“Second,
there is strong pressure on arbitrators to follow other tribunals’ decisions,
even though stare decisis does not govern international arbitration. As stated
by one ECT scholar, ‘[t]he reasoning of almost all modern arbitral awards
demonstrate [sic] the great care investment arbitral tribunals apply to en-
sure they are positioned in the mainstream of emerging jurisprudence.’”).
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Still, few argue that this development represents a shift in
the authoritative sources of international law.  Critics, of
course, argue that international criminal tribunals have over-
reached in finding customary international law on the basis of
a few post World War II cases.  They seem to suggest that
judges on those courts are incompetent, lazy, or legislating an
agenda from the bench.98  At worst, the reliance on precedent
threatens the legality principle, finding criminal liability on
the basis of a few long-forgotten decisions.  Defenders of the
tribunals, on the other hand, argue that judges are being true
to traditional doctrine.  They argue that judges either are care-
ful and responsible in applying customary international law99
or that the cases cited are good evidence of state practice and
opinio juris.100  They may argue that general practice is a broad
enough concept to include judicial practice, e.g., court deci-
sions,101 or that judicial opinions may reflect opinio juris.102
Looking at these courts and tribunals through the lens of
the revised doctrine of sources suggested reveals a different set
of explanations.  Judges operating in areas of international law
that are particularly oriented towards adjudication may have
good reasons, beyond laziness, incompetence, or advocacy to
rely on precedent.  For one, they may simply need precedent
98. Bhala, supra note 96, at 914 n.214 (“The judge may refer to a prece- R
dent because he is impressed by the authority of the prior court, because he
is persuaded by its reasoning, because he is too lazy to think the problem
through himself, because he does not want to risk reversal on appeal, or for
a variety of other reasons.”).
99. Theodor Meron, Editorial Comment, Revival of Customary Humanita-
rian Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 817, 821 (2005) (“[I]nternational criminal tribu-
nals have taken an essentially conservative and traditional approach to the
identification and application of customary international law principles.”).
100. Cf. Int’l Thunderbird Gaming Corp., supra note 97, at 571 (“The role R
of precedent has been recognised de facto in the reasoning style of tribu-
nals, but can also be formally inferred from Art. 1131 (1) of the NAFTA—
which calls for application of the ‘applicable rules of international law’;
these include, according to Art. 38 of the statute of the International Court
of Justice: ‘International custom, as evidence of general practice accepted as
law’ and ‘judicial decisions’ as ‘subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law.’”).
101. See, e.g., Moreman, supra note 77 (discussing the role of national R
court decisions in the formation of state practice).
102. See, e.g., Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 76, at 230 (“[T]he opinio juris R
element . . . may be inferred from court decisions.”).
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in order to do their jobs.103  Judges need (or at least want)
neutral sources that they can use to legitimate their decisions.
Normally, custom might provide such a source.  In both inter-
national criminal law and investment arbitration, however, cus-
tom’s traditional ingredients—state practice and opinio juris—
seem anything but neutral.104  Take international criminal law.
Although it may be possible to find widespread state practice
and opinio juris on the broadest questions of international
criminal law—e.g., the broad contours of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes—that almost certainly can-
not be the case with the more refined liability issues that tribu-
nals are forced to decide.  Few states are going to have state (as
opposed to judicial) practice with regard to the mens rea for
international crimes, the exact scope of liability for each, etc.
In reality, only two types of states are really going to have state
practice relevant to the legal issues that tribunals are forced to
decide:  (1) states that have prosecuted international crimes
and (2) states that have committed them.  Tribunals are quite
obviously going to avoid relying on the latter, but the former
are problematic as well.  The arguments of prosecuting states
can be assumed to be at least as biased as a prosecutor’s argu-
ment about law in the domestic criminal context—and no one
would suggest that the arguments of prosecutors should simply
be treated as law.  Like domestic prosecutors, such states can
be assumed to argue for the interpretations most likely to win
conviction, rather than provide a neutral assessment of the le-
gal landscape.  In the absence then of any neutral state prac-
tice, the tribunals need another source.  International or na-
tional judicial practice, which at least has weighed the argu-
ments of the prosecutor states against the interests of the
103. See Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpreta-
tion: The Dual Role of States, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 188–91 (2010) (explain-
ing how the imprecision of investment treaties necessarily shifts interpretive
power to investment tribunals).
104. See id. at 179–80 (“The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(Vienna Convention) provides that the treaty parties’ subsequent agree-
ments and practice shall be taken into account in interpretation. . . . Yet
investor-state tribunals have tended to shun this interpretive approach, ap-
parently because of concerns about ensuring equality of arms between claim-
ant investors and respondent states and protecting against the adoption by
states of self-interested interpretations.”).
32329-nyi_44-4 Sheet No. 21 Side B      09/04/2012   13:10:36
32329-nyi_44-4 Sheet No. 21 Side B      09/04/2012   13:10:36
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYI\44-4\NYI402.txt unknown Seq: 34  4-SEP-12 11:08
1082 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 44:1049
accused defendants, may seem like a more legitimate, more
appropriate source.
Moreover, as in the example of human rights, in interna-
tional criminal law, states are no longer the only relevant legal
actors and stakeholders.105  For one thing, the relevant legal
community of international criminal law includes defendants
and victims, the rights of whom must be taken into account.
But that legal community, that “community of practice,”106
also arguably includes both judges and the lawyers who serve
as prosecutors and defense attorneys.  Courts play a very differ-
ent role in international criminal law than in other areas of
international law.  In other areas of the law, courts play a pe-
ripheral role; most law is made, followed, interpreted, and
hashed out directly between states.  Courts are central, how-
ever, to international criminal law.  The primary paradigm and
function of international criminal law is the trial.  In this con-
text, the judge is no longer a neutral referee, but instead the
ultimate arbiter of international justice.  It is the judge, not
states, who decides ultimate guilt or innocence.  Lawyers too,
play a different role in international criminal law.  Prosecutors
and defenders do not serve merely as extensions of states and
do not simply mouth state positions.  Instead they play inde-
pendent roles as officers of the court representing the inter-
ests of international justice or the interests of their clients.
The legitimacy of international criminal law will be judged not
only by states—the traditional community of international
law—but by defendants, victims, lawyers, and judges as well.
Including defendants, victims, and judges in the relevant
community helps explain the pull of precedent.  Neither de-
fendants nor victims can really rely on state practices to pro-
tect their interests.  Defendants need a neutral source free
from the bias of the states who seek to prosecute them, and
victims need a neutral source free from the bias of the states
who abused them.  Moreover, due process and fairness require
consistency in treatment from one case to the next—such con-
105. Kenneth Anderson makes a similar point, noting that “[n]ew and dif-
ferent communities of interpretation and authority, as we might call them,
have been emerging in the arena of the laws of war.”  Anderson, supra note
64, at 349. R
106. See discussion of Emanuel Adler and “communities of practice,”
supra notes 56–65. R
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sistency seems impossible without giving prior decisions prece-
dential weight.107  The introduction of domestic criminal law-
yers into the field has undoubtedly helped bring those con-
cerns to the forefront.
A similar story can be told about international investment
arbitration.  In that context, states have specifically agreed to
give individual investors a seat at the table.  Those investors
now make up a part of the international investment law com-
munity and they along with states will judge the legitimacy of
arbitral decisions.108  In order for investors to take the
promises of arbitration seriously (and increase investment ac-
cordingly) they must believe that the rules that will apply to
those arbitrations will be neutral.  To rely on state practice
alone to fill gaps in established law might appear biased.
States are, of course, one of the parties to these disputes.  Both
investors and states (along with the lawyers who advise them)
also crave certainty and predictability.109  Contracts become
much easier for both sides to negotiate when they have a
clearer idea of the law that will apply.  Precedent can play a
powerful role as a neutral, predictable source of law.  It also
feeds into a feedback loop.  As adjudication/arbitration be-
comes the norm, state-to-state settlements become less com-
mon.  A growing body of precedent arguably means a dimin-
ishing store of state practice.110  To the extent that state prac-
107. William W. Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law
Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 729, 757–58 (2003)
(suggesting that use of precedent is necessary to avoid unfairly divergent
results for defendants and to uphold the universality of international crimi-
nal law); Asa W. Markel, The Future of State Secrets in War Crime Prosecutions, 16
MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 411, 427 (2007) (suggesting that the ICTY adopted a
policy of stare decisis as result of due process concerns of certainty and pre-
dictability).
108. Paul Berman seems to make a similar suggestion, describing interna-
tional investment arbitration as an area in which “non-sovereign communi-
ties” are generating norms, and describing investment treaties as “em-
power[ing] private actors to develop international norms.” Berman, Pluralist
Approach, supra note 11, at 314–15. R
109. For this reason, arguments for reform in investment arbitration often
include calls for greater reliance on precedent rather than less.  See Franck,
supra note 97, at 1617–25 (arguing for investment arbitration court of ap- R
peals to establish clear precedents that arbitral tribunals can then follow).
110. Moreover, states arguably rely on those precedents.  Paradoxically,
then, from the standpoint of traditional doctrine, state practice reflects judi-
cial precedent rather than the other way around.
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tice becomes increasingly fleeting and marginal, the turn
towards adjudication/arbitration may actually make reliance
on traditional sources less legitimate.
From the perspective of the revised sources theory sug-
gested here, reliance on precedent thus looks less like an error
and more like the emergence of a new set of legitimacy rules
within the communities of international criminal law and in-
ternational investment law.  Those communities, which now
include stakeholders and actors beyond just states, appear to
be grasping for something beyond state practice that can cre-
ate legitimately neutral and predictable gap-filling rules.  What
traditional notions of custom seem to lack in legitimacy, prece-
dent seems to provide.
C. Global Administrative Law
A different sort of challenge to traditional international
law doctrine has emerged from the project of Global Adminis-
trative Law.111  As part of that project, scholars have begun to
document and study the wide variety of international regimes
that are increasingly seeking to regulate international com-
merce, trade, investment, among other areas, with rules that
look, and sometimes act, like binding law.112  Some of these
111. See generally Kingsbury et al., Global Governance as Administration, supra
note 7 (setting out core concepts of Global Administrative Law); Benedict R
Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005) [hereinafter Kingsbury et al., Emergence] (surveying
major issues and challenges in the field of Global Administrative Law).
112. Kingsbury et al., Global Governance as Administration, supra note 7, at 2. R
The contemporary starting point is thus the rapidly changing pat-
tern of transnational regulation and its administration, a pattern
that now ranges from regulation-by-non-regulation (laissez faire),
through formal self-regulation (such as by some industry associa-
tions), hybrid private-private regulation (for example, business-
NGO partnerships in the Fair Labor Association), hybrid public-
private regulation (for instance, in mutual recognition arrange-
ments where a private agency in one country tests products to cer-
tify compliance with governmental standards of another country),
network governance by state officials (as in the work of the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on
environmental policies to be followed by national export credit
agencies), inter-governmental organizations with significant but in-
direct regulatory powers (for example, regulation of ozone deplet-
ing substances under the Montreal Protocol), and inter-govern-
mental organizations with direct governance powers (as with deter-
32329-nyi_44-4 Sheet No. 23 Side A      09/04/2012   13:10:36
32329-nyi_44-4 Sheet No. 23 Side A      09/04/2012   13:10:36
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYI\44-4\NYI402.txt unknown Seq: 37  4-SEP-12 11:08
2012] FINDING INTERNATIONAL LAW, PART II 1085
regimes, like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its
dispute settlement body, are the formal product of treaties and
technically (and doctrinally) international law.  Others, how-
ever, are more informal, including networks of government of-
ficials like the Basel Committee,113 hybrid public-private orga-
nizations like the Codex Alimentarius,114 and private organiza-
tions like the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO).115  Regardless of the de facto force their rules may ex-
ert, those rules are often not technically international law. 116
The rules adopted by these regimes are increasingly im-
portant and binding, but what has really garnered the atten-
tion scholars associated with Global Administrative Law are the
increasingly administrative-law-like procedures these regimes
have developed to enact these rules.  What these scholars have
noted is that, in many of these regimes, as the authority and
bindingness of their rules has increased, so too has pressure to
follow certain rules of process.  Moreover, “[t]hese demands,
and responses to them, are increasingly framed in terms that
have an administrative law character.”117  Among other things,
these regimes have been asked to grant stakeholders greater
participation in the decision-making processes and to make
those processes more transparent, to give reasons for their de-
minations by the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees of individuals’ refugee status, or the WTO dispute resolu-
tion system for trade conflicts).
Id.
113. See Kingsbury et al., Emergence, supra note 111, at 21 (“The agreements R
are non-binding in legal form but can be highly effective.”); see also David
Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International
Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281, 287–91 (1998)
(describing the informal constitution and flexible internal organization of
the Basel Committee).
114. See generally Michael A. Livermore, Note, Authority and Legitimacy in
Global Governance: Deliberation, Institutional Differentiation, and the Codex Ali-
mentarius, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 766 (2006) (discussing the administrative law
procedure of the Codex).
115. Kingsbury et al., Emergence, supra note 111, at 22. R
116. Id. at 16 (“[M]uch of the detail and implementation of such regula-
tion is determined by transnational administrative bodies—including inter-
national organizations and informal groups of officials—that perform ad-
ministrative functions but are not directly subject to control by national gov-
ernments or domestic legal systems or, in the case of treaty-based regimes,
the states party to the treaty.”).
117. Kingsbury et al., Global Governance as Administration, supra note 7, at 2. R
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cisions and allow for meaningful review, and to conform their
eventual regulations to standards of means-end proportional-
ity.118
The ISO is a good example.119  The ISO issues “standards
and technical specifications for a vast array of products and
processes.”120  The ISO’s members are national standards bod-
ies, some of which are made up of industry advocacy groups,
others are government agencies, while still others are made up
of some combination of the two.121  Technically, the ISO is a
voluntary organization, both in the sense that membership is
voluntary and that adherence to the ISO’s 15,000 plus stan-
dards is voluntary.  In fact, though, its standards have become
increasingly binding, either because they’re costly not to fol-
low in a globalized world, or because its standards have be-
come safe harbors in both national laws and the Technical
Barriers to Trade agreement.122  As the force of the ISO’s stan-
dards have increased, so too has its reach.  The ISO has begun
to move into areas beyond its original mandate, enacting stan-
dards in environmental management and corporate responsi-
bility.123
Both of these trends have led to pushes for greater ac-
countability, and the ISO has responded with a series of ad-
ministrative-law-like responses.  In addition to adopting con-
siderable notice and comment rule-making, the ISO has
broadened participation and transparency by creating a liaison
118. Id. (“These evolving regulatory structures are each confronted with
demands for transparency, consultation, participation, reasoned decisions,
and review mechanisms to promote accountability.”).
119. This discussion of the ISO is largely derived from Eran Shamir-Borer,
The Evolution of Administrative Law-Type Principles, Mechanisms and Prac-
tices in the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) (Oct. 4,
2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.iilj.org/courses/
documents/EranShamir-Borer.ISOPaperfor100406.pdf.
120. Margaret M. Blair et al., The New Role for Assurance Services in Global
Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325, 330 (2008).
121. Shamir-Borer, supra note 119, at 12–14. R
122. Id. at 4–5; David A. Wirth, Compliance with Non-Binding Norms of Trade
and Finance, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING
NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 330, 338–41 (Dinah Shelton
ed., 2000); Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
Legal Instruments–Results of the Uruguay Round, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120
(1995).
123. Shamir-Borer, supra note 119, at 3–4. R
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membership for NGOs, a new code of ethics that requires
greater participation within the national member bodies,124
the creation of a fund to help smaller states participate more
effectively in standard making,125 and pilot programs to pub-
lish some of their regulations on the web.126
But the ISO is not alone.  “The growing commonality of
these administrative law-type principles and practices is build-
ing a unity between otherwise disparate areas of govern-
ance.”127
Thus the WTO Appellate Body now requires . . .
member states to follow certain administrative proce-
dures before excluding imports, the Basel Committee
of central bankers now puts out drafts of its proposals
for capital adequacy for wide comment before adopt-
ing them, the UN Security Council has adopted a lim-
ited review mechanism to make it possible for people
listed as terrorist financiers to be delisted, the World
Bank operates a notice and comment process before
adopting policies and has an Inspection Panel to
hear complaints that it has breached its policies, and
the International Olympic Committee follows an
elaborate procedure for athletes suspected of doping
and has a review process culminating in arbitration at
the International Court of Arbitration for Sport.128
The emergence of a global administrative law is difficult
to square with the traditional doctrine of sources. 129  Many of
these administrative-law-like rules are emerging in private or
public-private organizations and networks as opposed to state-
state institutions.  To the extent that there are neither states
nor treaties or custom involved, such rules are invisible to the
traditional doctrine of sources.  These rules may be some-
124. Id. at 80.
125. Id. at 48–49.
126. Id. at 59–60.
127. Kingsbury et al., Global Governance as Administration, supra note 7, at 2. R
128. Kingsbury, International Law as Inter-Public Law, supra note 38, at 190. R
129. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative
Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23, 26 (2009) [hereinafter Kingsbury, The Concept of
‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law] (“If a claim to ‘law’ is made in applying
the label GAL in some of these situations, it is a claim that diverges from,
and can be sharply in tension with the classical models of consent-based in-
ter-state international law and most models of national law.”).
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thing, but they are not international law.130  But even where
there is a formal treaty, as in the example of the WTO, doc-
trine may have trouble explaining the emergence of adminis-
trative law features.  One commonly cited example of adminis-
trative process rules at the WTO was the dispute settlement
body’s requirement in the Shrimp/Turtle case that foreigners
be given adequate opportunities to participate in U.S. regula-
tory decisions.131  Scholars are quick to note though that such
a requirement is hard to find in any treaty or international
law.132  Moreover, even if emerging administrative law rules in
one regime could be traced to a particular treaty or to more
general principles of international law, dividing the category
between those rules dictated by international law and those
outside of it seems less than satisfying.  To the extent to which
these administrative law rules seem to be emerging as part of a
common phenomenon (with different regimes borrowing
rules from each other), they seem to call out for a unified ex-
planation or source.133
Viewing these emerging rules through the lens of “com-
munities of practice”134 and a revised doctrine of sources
makes sense of the Global Administrative Law phenome-
non.135  It appears that communities of practice are develop-
ing within and across particular regulatory regimes.  The form
130. Kingsbury et al., Global Governance as Administration, supra note 7, at 5 R
(“This field of law is described as ‘global’ rather than ‘international’ to re-
flect both the inclusion in it of a large array of informal institutional arrange-
ments (many involving prominent roles for non-state actors), and its founda-
tion in normative practices, and normative sources, that are not encom-
passed within standard conceptions of ‘international law.’”).
131. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 180–184, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 8, 1998);
Kingsbury et al., Emergence, supra note 111, at 36. R
132. See also Kingsbury, International Law as Inter-Public Law, supra note 38, R
at 190–91 (“It is influenced by treaties and fundamental customary interna-
tional law rules, but it goes beyond these sources and sometimes moves away
from them.”).
133. See generally Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative
Law, supra note 129, at 26 (attempting to devise such an explanation). R
134. See supra text accompanying notes 56–68. R
135. Benedict Kingsbury suggests something similar, arguing for a con-
cept of inter-public law that can replace inter-national law and that would
recognize various regulatory regimes alongside states as distinct legal com-
munities subject to public law constraints. See generally Kingsbury, Interna-
tional Law as Inter-Public Law, supra note 38, at 190. R
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of these regimes—legal, quasi-legal, or non-legal, national,
transnational, or international—is irrelevant.  Instead, what is
relevant is the increasing law-like nature of the rules in the
area and the decreasing opportunities for exit.  Both have led
stakeholders and other members of these communities to de-
mand greater control and access to the decision-making
processes in these areas, often in the form of administrative
law type rules and procedures.  New legitimacy rules seem to
be emerging, which requires some combination of participa-
tion, transparency, reason-giving, review, and proportionality
that can legitimate the rules in the eyes of the relevant com-
munity.  The project of Global Administrative Law, much like
the project of the revised doctrine of sources, can be seen as
an attempt to document the internalized legitimacy rules in
each of these communities.  Moreover, the communities of
state officials, lawyers, NGOs, and business interests in each of
these regimes overlap, helping to spread a particular toolbox
of procedures from one regime to the next.  As actors begin to
internalize certain administrative law norms in one regime, it
becomes increasingly difficult for them to accept unreview-
able, unreasoned, closed-door decisions made in other re-
gimes—even if on paper, such decisions are completely legal.
D. The Diversity of International Legal Communities
In each of the three areas discussed so far, human rights,
tribunal law, and global administrative law, new legal commu-
nities with new legitimacy rules seem to be emerging.  In some
ways, the story behind each seems quite similar.  Each area ex-
emplifies the increasing specialization of international law;
new specialized bodies of law are increasingly applied by sub-
ject area specialists (some of whom may have been educated in
legal areas other than traditional public international law)
who represent groups and interests only recently affected by
international legal regulation.  In such situations, we would ex-
pect views on substantive law and doctrine to diverge, but it
might also seem reasonable to expect the divergence of legiti-
macy rules that the above discussions suggest.  As Adler ex-
plains, “[i]t is within communities of practice that collective
meanings emerge, discourses become established, identities
fixed, learning takes place, new political agendas arise, and the
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institutions and practices of global governance grow.”136  It is
through intense involvement with other participants in a par-
ticular regime that community specific understandings of law
and legitimacy begin to form.  As constructivist international
relations scholars have taught, agents and structure, in this
case, law and legal actors, are mutually constituting.  Deep en-
gagement with human rights, international criminal lawyering,
international investment arbitration, or a transnational regula-
tory regime should be expected to shape the expectations and
understandings of its participants in ways different from non-
participants.
But these three examples also demonstrate the diversity of
the shapes communities can take.  In one example, tribunal
law, we see a community developing around a small group of
expert practitioners in a highly specialized area.  The special
challenges created by the type of practice and its relative insu-
lation from the rest of international law fuel the shift away
from old legitimacy rules toward new ones.  In another area,
human rights, we see a much more diffuse community, with a
wide variety of different members—states, NGOs, experts, in-
dividuals—participating in different ways, with different levels
of influence, at different times, in different fora.  Participants
are separated by geography, politics, training, and social cir-
cumstance; they are connected only by shared reference to
human rights language.137  Emerging legitimacy rules are
deeply and broadly contested.  Finally, in the last area, global
administrative law, the legal community cuts across a variety of
subfields, as practitioners and advocates reach into other areas
in search of principles they can learn and borrow.  The “com-
munity” is tacit (virtual?) at best—the product of relations,
connections, and mutual learning.  The existence of the com-
munity only becomes apparent (perhaps even to participants)
upon academic description.
IV. FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW TO INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICTS OF LAW
So far, this Article has sought to better understand the
nature of sources within international law.  In so doing, it has
136. ADLER, supra note 56, at 15. R
137. Participants may also be connected through a sense of shared pro-
ject.
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suggested that international law may no longer represent a sin-
gle community of states with a single set of internalized legiti-
macy rules, but instead a series of overlapping communities
with overlapping members, each of which may be in the pro-
cess of adopting a new set of internalized legitimacy rules.  If
this account is at all persuasive, does it provide any lessons
about the “fragmentation” of international law or what to do
about it?
The problem of fragmentation is often seen as a jurisdic-
tional or doctrinal one.  As international law has expanded to
regulate a wider and wider array of human activity, specialized
bodies of law—international environmental law, international
human rights law, international investment law, international
trade law, international criminal law—have emerged.  These
new specialties have been joined by increasingly specialized
courts, tribunals, and expert bodies.  These new bodies have
joined an already large number of state courts capable of hear-
ing international claims and pronouncing judgments on inter-
national rules.  Almost inevitably, the combination of increas-
ing specialization and choices of law announcing fora has led
to divergent views on what international law requires and what
international law rules actually mean.  Without a single hierar-
chy of courts that might sort out these differences, fragmenta-
tion of international doctrine is the likely result.
Framed this way, it should not be surprising that many of
the proposed solutions have focused on either doctrine—rec-
onciling doctrinal differences138 or devising doctrinal fixes to
resolve disputes139—or on jurisdiction—devising rules to man-
age when disputes should be heard by particular bodies140 and
138. See, e.g., Milanovic, supra note 13, at 92 (relying on Article 103 of the R
U.N. Charter as rule of norm conflict resolution); Roberts, supra note 6, at R
758 (explaining the difference between traditional and modern custom);
Teitel & Howse, supra note 5 (suggesting “law of humanity” Grundnorm). R
139. U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation Report, supra note 2, at 211, ¶ R
419; see also Dupuy, supra note 14, at 801–02 (considering a more robust role R
for the ICJ in resolving disputes over international law); Kammerhofer, supra
note 4 (describing such approaches). R
140. See generally Tullio Treves, Conflicts Between the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea and the International Court of Justice, 31 INT’L L. & POL. 809
(1999).
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rules concerning how much respect certain bodies should give
the judgment of others.141
But the discussion of sources here suggests that the prob-
lem is not merely interpretative.  It is not simply the doctrine
or forum choices that are fragmenting; the international com-
munity itself appears to be fragmenting.  At least some of the
disputes described as fragmentation seem to have their origin
in disputes over the nature of the legal community and the
standards by which legitimate rules will be judged.  Debates
over the relationship between human rights law and interna-
tional humanitarian law—the extent to which human rights
rules (including the ICCPR) apply to the “global war on ter-
ror,”142 the specific effect of the “Martens clause” of the Hague
Conventions,143 the jurisdiction of human rights bodies to
141. See, e.g., YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 278 (2003)  (suggesting that courts exercise
comity towards each other); Christian Leathley, An Institutional Hierarchy to
Combat the Fragmentation of International Law: Has the ILC Missed an Opportu-
nity, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 259, 261 (2007) (creating “a hierarchy with
the ICJ at its apex [and]  . . . identif[ying] a number of ‘foundation stones’
for an institutional framework” that explains the amount of weight to be
given to judgments of different courts); Martinez, supra note 3, at 449–53 R
(providing examples of judicial doctrines aimed at creating judicial effi-
ciency in cases of overlapping or concurrent jurisdiction).
142. Compare U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rap-
porteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, ¶¶ 29, 32–34,
42–44, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (affirming applica-
bility of human rights law to targeted killings committed in the territory of
foreign states), with U.S. Dep’t of State, Second and Third Periodic Report of the
United States of America to the UN Committee on Human Rights Concerning the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex I (Oct. 21, 2005)
(asserting territorial limits to the ICCPR).
143. The Martens clause declares the view of the High Contracting Parties
that “[u]ntil a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, . . . popula-
tions and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the princi-
ples of international law, as they result from the usages established between
civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the
public conscience.”  Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and
Customs of War on Land pmbl., July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803.  A slightly differ-
ent version appears in the 1907 Hague Convention. See Hague Convention
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land pmbl., Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277.  Broad readings of the clause are used to support the integra-
tion of human rights norms into the law of war. See Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Decision on Request for Precautionary Measures (Detainees in Guantanamo Bay)
(Mar. 12, 2002), reprinted in 41 I.L.M. 532 (2002) [hereinafter Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Decision—Detainees]; Hans-Joachim Heintze, On the Relation-
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consider law of war issues like detainee treatment144—all seem
better understood as conflicts between a human rights legiti-
macy community that prioritizes the interests of the individual
and human dignity and state-centered law-of-war community
that prioritizes state consent and views diminutions of state
sovereignty with suspicion.  The conflict in the Kadi case, be-
tween the Security Council’s order to freeze the assets of desig-
nated individuals and European law concerns that due process
standards be met,145 might best be seen as a conflict between
more traditional state-centered readings of the U.N. Charter
and emerging norms of due process legitimacy in both the
human rights and global administrative law communities.  De-
bates over the legality of generic drugs under the TRIPS agree-
ment pit the human rights community’s expansive reading of
the promises in the Doha declaration146 regarding developing
countries and public health against First World trading states’
insistence on strict intellectual property protection and the
strictures of traditional rules of treaty interpretation.147
ship Between Human Rights Law Protection and International Humanitarian Law,
86 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 789, 797–98 (2004).  States seeking to distinguish
the two areas of law more clearly read the clause much more narrowly. See
Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of
Public Conscience, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 78, 85–86 (2000) (describing state posi-
tions).
144. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Reiteration and Further Amplification of Precau-
tionary Measures (Detainees in Guantanamo Bay) (Oct. 28, 2005), reprinted in 45
I.L.M. 673 (2006); Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Reiteration of Precautionary Mea-
sures Regarding Detainees in Guantanamo (July 23, 2002), reprinted in 45 I.L.M.
667 (2006); Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Response of the United States to Request for
Precautionary Measures (Detainees in Guantanamo Bay) (Apr. 15, 2002), reprinted
in 41 I.L.M. 1015 (2002); Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Decision—Detainees, supra
note 143. R
145. See Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al
Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. ¶ 327. Kadi in-
volved the Security Council’s decisions to freeze assets of individuals accused
of financing terrorism and the extent to which European states and the Eu-
ropean Community could or should implement those decisions where state
and community norms of due process had not been met.
146. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 Novem-
ber 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002), available at http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm.
147. Although regularly invoked by advocates for developing countries
and human rights, the exact status of the declaration under international
law is in considerable dispute. See generally Carmen Otero Garcia-Castrillon,
An Approach to the WTO Ministerial Declaration on the Trips Agreement and Public
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To be clear, some disagreements about international law
are unquestionably interpretative in nature.  This Article does
not argue that all conflicts over international law doctrine are
conflicts over legitimacy rules, but the fact that some may be
changes how we might think about resolving them.148
In a sense, this makes the fragmentation of international
law part of a broader problem of transnational regime con-
flict—the conflicts and competition between international law
regimes, regional regimes,149 domestic regimes,150 and private
regulatory regimes—something the example of Global Admin-
istrative Law might already have suggested.151  It thus dovetails
well with the observations of pluralists, who have described
both these problems, one within international law and one
outside of it, as the result of conflict between overlapping juris-
generative, normative, legal communities.152  To the extent
that the insights here have been prefigured by legal pluralists,
Health, 5 J. INTL. ECON. L. 212 (2002); Steve Charnovitz, The Legal Status of the
Doha Declarations, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 207 (2002); James Thuo Gathii, The
Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on Trips and Public Health Under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 291 (2002).
148. Furthermore, we may not be capable of reliably distinguishing be-
tween these two types of conflict.  The possibility of legitimacy conflicts may
be a reality that cannot be avoided.
149. Kadi, 2008 E.C.R. ¶ 327.
150. Medellı´n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008); Loewen Group Inc. v. United
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Decision on Hearing of Respon-
dent’s Objection to Competence and Jurisdiction of January 5, 2001, 7 IC-
SID Rep. 421 (2005); Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and
Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485 (2005) (discussing cases).
151. Cf. Kingsbury, International Law as Inter-Public Law, supra note 38, at R
188–89 (“However, there is no strong reason to limit the category of public
law entities—and of participants in inter-public law—to states.  As trans-
border interactions among all such public law entities increase, situations
where they bump up against each other multiply, generating conflicts of law
arrangements in the public law sphere.”).
152. See Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 3, at 1003–04.  Paul R
Berman has also looked to the literature on legal pluralism for an answer,
but he has primarily focused on conflicts between competing official legal
communities, e.g., France and the United States, Europe and France, the ICJ
and the United States.  He does imply though that legal pluralism’s insights
might apply to intra-regime conflicts as well, e.g., conflicts between interna-
tional investment law and international human rights law, as well. See
Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 10, at 1228–35; Berman, Pluralist R
Approach, supra note 11, at 316–20; Berman, Conflict of Laws, supra note 11, at R
1110–12.
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the account here grounds those pluralist accounts, which have
generally been phrased at a high level of abstraction,153 in doc-
trinal terms and attempts to work through the doctrinal impli-
cations of such pluralist views.  The account here bridges the
gap between doctrinal and theoretical conceptions of interna-
tional law.
The aspect of this approach likely to cause the most diffi-
culty is the overlapping nature of the legal communities in
question.  (This is undoubtedly part of the reason that plural-
ist accounts of disputes within international law remain less
clear than pluralist accounts of disputes outside international
law.)  Easy boundaries cannot be drawn around the commu-
nity of international criminal law or the community of human
rights law or the community of global administrative law in the
way that they might be drawn between France and Germany.
Of course, even when talking about more traditional conflicts
between political entities, lines get blurred, as the conflicts be-
tween state law, regional law, and international law in Kadi
demonstrate.154  It is arguably the overlapping nature of each
of those regimes and the differing requirements they seem to
impose that made the case so devilishly difficult.  Moreover,
one of the key contributions of legal pluralism was the recog-
nition that colonial law never fully displaced the laws of the
colonized, that on the contrary, the two became intermeshed
as colonial peoples found themselves subject to the laws of
overlapping communities.  The conflicts caused by fragmenta-
tion are as visceral as they are—between international humani-
tarian and international human rights law, for example—be-
cause they force individuals to confront the competing legiti-
macy of the overlapping communities to which they belong—
the rules, values, norms of each they normally keep compart-
mentalized.
But in their overlapping nature, these legal communities
also defy easy analogy to other types of conflicts.  The conflicts
between these communities are both conflicts between subject
areas—which are usually resolved through doctrine—and con-
flicts between legal communities—which might be dealt with
153. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 10, at 1177 (“Finally, plu- R
ralism frees scholars from needing an essentialist definition of ‘law.’”).
154. Kadi, 2008 E.C.R. ¶ 327.
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through conflicts of law rules.155  Doctrinal fixes fail to capture
the group interests reflected in opposing rules, while conflicts
of law rules, traditionally concerned with relationships to terri-
tory or government interests, seem inapposite to disputes be-
tween substantive areas of law.156  As Ralf Michaels and Joost
Pauwelyn insightfully explain, conflicts between substantive ar-
eas, what they refer to as conflicts of norms, often require bal-
ancing the interests involved.  But “[s]ince balancing is a func-
tion of the relative weight of different principles, and this rela-
tive weight may be different within different legal systems,
balancing between legal systems will often not resolve the con-
flict between these different balancing results.”157  Conflicts of
law analogies fare no better.  As they explain,
even where we can speak of different sub-systems or
branches of international law (say, [WTO] law and
human rights law), these are not defined by territory
or personality, and neither WTO law nor human
rights law has its own government with conceivable
governmental interests, so the criteria developed in
these particular conflict-of-laws approaches are not
applicable as such.158
If international law is spawning new overlapping legal commu-
nities, how then should we resolve disputes between them?
The goal of this Article is primarily descriptive—to show how a
more nuanced, updated approach to sources can reframe the
fragmentation problem—and a solution to these disputes is
beyond its scope.  But recognizing that many of these disputes
are between communities and over legitimacy helps to at least
frame some of the options.  There appear to be at least four
broad approaches available: (1) a conservative/common de-
nominator approach, (2) a more radical/inclusive approach,
(2) a managerial/pluralist approach, and (4) a competition/
155. In essence, it is as if tort law is provided by Georgia law and contract
law by Jewish law.  The conflict between subject areas is co-extensive with the
conflict between legal regimes.
156. For a very insightful discussion of the problem with these analogies,
see Ralf Michaels & Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws?: Dif-
ferent Techniques in the Fragmentation of International Law, in MULTI-SOURCE
EQUIVALENT NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (Tomer Broude & Yuval
Shany eds., 2011).
157. Id. at 26.
158. Id. at 14.
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politics approach.  International tribunals and scholars have
already begun experimenting with some of these approaches,
perhaps tacit recognition that a choice of community mindset
is necessary.
A. The Conservative/Common Denominator Approach
One approach to the fragmentation described here is to
retain the traditional doctrine of sources as a conflicts rule.
Such an approach would recognize that the traditional doc-
trine may not be an accurate description of international legal
sources, but would nonetheless use the traditional doctrine as
a rule of decision for resolving international disputes.159  In a
sense, this is how international law currently operates.  Com-
munities’ views on international legal sources may be evolving,
but those communities are still forced to argue in Article 38
terms.  A novel legal argument will only succeed before a more
generalized international law body or with the more general
international law community to the extent that it can plausibly
be framed in traditional terms.
There are a number of arguments in favor of such an ap-
proach.  One argument might simply go to manageability.  A
likely complaint about the functional/plural approach to
sources and fragmentation described here might be that it is
simply too complex, too nuanced to be useful.  Law needs le-
gal fictions.  The traditional doctrine of sources may be wrong,
but it remains a reasonably simple, and the only agreed-upon,
set of rules for resolving international law disputes.
A second argument goes to the common denominator as-
pect of this approach.  States are necessary members of all
these new communities of international law.  At the end of the
day, enforcing the rules of any of these regimes requires the
acquiescence of official state actors.  States might not surpris-
ingly want to retain a doctrine of sources that focuses on state
consent and official state action.  Such rules allow them to con-
trol and monitor the rules being developed.  To the extent
that states demand application of a more traditional set of
sources, there may be no other choice.  It may also allow states,
as relatively organized, relatively representative, relatively re-
159. Of course, that is what Article 38 on its face purports to do—it pro-
vides a rule of decision for international courts.
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sponsible actors (in democratic states at least, they may re-
present the interests of other stakeholders) to slow things
down, and to make sure that the rules emerging from much
less organized communities (which might be much more open
to capture) are fully vetted and thought through.
But states might not be alone in favoring such an ap-
proach.  Although such an approach would certainly diminish
the autonomy of new communities,160 for example, human
rights, advocates within that community may prefer unity over
fragmentation.  A fully plural approach that applies the rules
of each community to its own affairs decreases the chance that
the values of each community can influence each other.
Human rights advocates may not want to give up the opportu-
nity to influence the norms of international humanitarian law;
members of the global administrative law community may
want the opportunity to argue that the norms they are devel-
oping should apply to public international law more generally.
Members of these communities may not be satisfied with au-
tonomy, but instead have imperial ambitions.  A single doc-
trine of sources can allow them to make arguments that slowly
shift the meaning of commonly held sources in the direction
they desire.161
The European Court of First Instance’s (CFI) approach to
the Kadi case162 provides a useful illustration.  In that case, the
CFI was faced with a conflict between the Security Council’s
order to freeze the assets of designated individuals and Euro-
pean law concerns that due process standards be met.  The
CFI approached the case from the standpoint of traditional
international law doctrine, under which the UN Charter pro-
vides no opportunity to review Security Council decisions and
under which the Charter has primacy over other regimes.  In
line with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, only
160. Though it should be noted that this approach only affects areas of
conflict, communities would retain considerable autonomy over legitimacy
rules in the ordinary course of their affairs.
161. Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel suggest that something similar is cur-
rently going on, that through cross-interpretation between tribunals, differ-
ent regimes have incorporated a “law of humanity” Grundnorm. See generally
Teitel & Howse, supra note 5, at 967–68. R
162. Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council & Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649; Case
T-306/01, Yusuf & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & Comm’n, 2005
E.C.R. II-3533.
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where jus cogens norms have been violated would there be a
possibility of review.  The CFI considered the possibility that
Human Rights and Global Administrative Law principles (both
of which, it was claimed, were not met by the Security Coun-
cil’s decision) could be translated into traditional doctrinal
terms, in this case a potential jus cogens norm of due process.
Had it recognized such a jus cogens norm, however, it would
have been a major victory for Human Rights and Global Ad-
ministrative Law, one with implications across international
law.  In this case, however, the CFI rejected that argument as
too novel.163
This is the problem, of course, with using the traditional
doctrine of sources.  More traditional approaches will more
often than not prevail.  It may not describe the actual life of
rules in the system, and it gives states considerable veto power
over rules that have been developing.  Its focus on state con-
sent is outdated.  As a result, such an approach could prove
highly unstable and quickly unravel as communities of legiti-
macy rebel against the conservativeness of traditional doc-
trine.164
B. The Radical/Inclusive Approach
A more radical approach would seek to hear the voices of
all community members. The goal would be to find rules that
reflect the interests of as many stakeholders as possible.  In
some cases, states may be relatively good interest aggregators
and a traditional doctrine built around state consent and state
negotiation may well represent the interested stakeholders.165
In the case of a dispute between communities, however, such
an approach would suggest using the legitimacy rules of the
most inclusive community whose members appear implicated.
For example, in a dispute between international humanitarian
law (arguably made by a community of states) and interna-
tional human rights law (a community that now appears to in-
163. See Gra´inne de Bu´rca, The European Court of Justice and the International
Legal Order After Kadi, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 19–22 (2010).
164. Cf. Cohen, supra note 8, at 95 (“[I]f the ‘law’ is commonly disre- R
garded and seems to have little impact on action, the meaningfulness of the
‘law’ must be doubted.”).
165. As Benedict Kingsbury explains, states “are accustomed to the opera-
tion of the principles of public law.” Kingsbury, International Law as Inter-
Public Law, supra note 38, at 188. R
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clude individuals), such an approach would suggest judging
the particular rule according to emerging legitimacy rules of
international human rights law.  Similar arguments have been
made in support of favoring human rights/environmental liti-
gation brought by indigenous groups over investor-state arbi-
tration of the same dispute.166  At first glance, such an ap-
proach might seem normatively appealing.
But this approach could prove difficult and potentially
dangerous.  One problem is that this approach requires identi-
fying the relevant stakeholders, a notoriously difficult task.  (In
the modern, globally interconnected world, who isn’t a stake-
holder in any given issue?)  A more dangerous aspect of such
an approach is that it assumes that more inclusive communi-
ties are actually more representative communities and allows
them to trump the judgments of others.  But this cannot be
assumed.  Human rights law may directly involve individuals in
lawmaking, arguably making it more inclusive at the interna-
tional level, but other interests, for example, of corporations,
may not be well represented in that community.  The views of
states may actually reflect a more inclusive deliberative pro-
cess—various stakeholders may have had their voices heard in
the formulation of the states’ views and the states’ views may
166. See, e.g., Steven Donziger, The Clash of Human Rights and BIT Investor
Claims: Chevron’s Abusive Litigation in Ecuador’s Amazon, 17 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8
(2010).  Donziger makes several references to the arbitral tribunal non-rep-
resentative nature.  “A successful human rights or commercial claim against
a foreign entity could be snatched away by a private court of arbitrators in
which the party initially bringing suit cannot be heard and has little or no
recourse.” Id. at 12.  “The communities, by arbitration rules, would not have
access to the proceedings, much less the opportunity to be a party.  Chev-
ron’s desired result would effectively strip tens of thousands of people of
their legal rights to seek a remedy against the perpetrator of what they con-
sider to be an environmental crime on their ancestral lands.” Id. at 11.  “A
typical arbitrator may never have visited the country over which he or she
will serve as de facto judge and jury and likely will have little appreciation for
the policy complexities at stake when the people who are often most im-
pacted are not represented before the panel.” Id. at 12.  “It is virtually im-
possible, given the arbitral rules that govern appointments, to have a panel
where the majority of arbitrators are outside of ‘The Club.’ Chevron’s ap-
pointed arbitrator in its hoped-for BIT case is an example of this phenome-
non.” Id.
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reflect more balanced assessments of the competing inter-
ests.167
Attempting to apply such an approach to the Kadi case
mentioned above168 demonstrates the basic problem.  Applied
to that case, the question would be whether the European or
Security Council regime was more representative of the rele-
vant stakeholders.  Arguments can be made in both directions.
On the one hand, the European model requires some due
process for the affected individual, perhaps allowing greater
individual participation.  On the other hand, the Security
Council represents more interests around the world.  Ameri-
cans, for example, have their interests in being free from ter-
rorism represented on the Security Council but not in the Eu-
ropean Union or its machinery.  There appears to be no neu-
tral way to make the choice.  Each regime is likely to see its
legitimacy rules as the most legitimate.
This framework thus raises the same concerns as tradi-
tional attempts to weigh the importance of competing re-
gimes’ interests in their particular laws.  From an external
point of view, as someone outside of either regime, there may
simply be no reliable metric for making such assessment.  In at
least the most difficult cases, each regime probably sees its laws
as vital.  In the same way, a determination of which community
is “most-representative” may defy neutral analysis.  Each com-
munity will claim the mantle for itself.  “Most-representative”
will be in the eye of the beholder.169
C. The Managerial/Pluralist Approach or “Let a
thousand flowers bloom”
Paul Berman, writing from a pluralist perspective, has ar-
gued for a series of rules that grant greater autonomy to over-
167. In the Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco example, see id., Chevron has argued
that it is actually the Ecuadorian litigation rather than the BIT arbitration
that is structurally biased and that the company has been denied due process
by officials biased in favor of the plaintiffs. See Lucien J. Dhooge, Aguinda v.
ChevronTexaco: Discretionary Grounds for the Non-Recognition of Foreign Judg-
ments for Environmental Injury in the United States, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 241,
272–95 (2010).
168. Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al
Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. ¶ 327.
169. An approach that asks which legitimacy rules are most legitimate
would, of course, face similar problems.
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lapping communities.  Examples of such approaches include:
subsidiarity, margins of appreciation, and complementarity.170
These approaches can be very attractive as the European ex-
ample (margins of appreciation) and the International Crimi-
nal Court (complementarity) suggest.  They give communities
room to develop their own norms.  They also provide compet-
ing institutions with rules of decision (or really of respect/
comity) that allow them to remain agnostic in disputes over
which communities’ rules are better or worse.  Rules granting
such limited autonomy are often applied by international re-
gimes to the decisions made by states, but decisions by one
international regime to defer to the decisions of another
might be examples of such an approach applied between dif-
ferent international law communities.  One example might be
the ICJ respectful treatment of ICTY findings regarding Geno-
cide in the Former Yugoslavia.171
The problem with these approaches is that their very flexi-
bility makes them largely indeterminate.172  It can be difficult
to choose between them and even more difficult to decide
170. See generally Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 10. R
171. The Court concluded that
it should in principle accept as highly persuasive relevant findings
of fact made by the Tribunal at trial, unless of course they have
been upset on appeal.  For the same reasons, any evaluation by the
Tribunal based on the facts as so found for instance about the exis-
tence of the required intent, is also entitled to due weight.
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007
I.C.J. 43, ¶ 223 (Feb. 26), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/
91/13685.pdf [hereinafter ICJ, Application of Genocide Convention].
172. Using the Kadi case again as an example, under a margin of apprecia-
tion model, the ECJ might have asked whether the Security Council’s deci-
sion sufficiently respected due process.  The ECJ itself made some references
to a possible margin of appreciation going in the other direction, granting
European states room to implement Security Council decisions differently.
See Giacinto della Cananea, Global Security and Procedural Due Process of Law
Between the United Nations and the European Union: Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al
Barakaat International Foundation v. Council, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 511, 519
(2009) (The ECJ points out that, once the UN has established a set of goals,
it leaves a considerable margin of appreciation for the fulfilment of these
objectives.”).  In either case, however, it is unclear what the standard of re-
view would actually be, nor is there a clear metric for weighing the two re-
gime’s concerns.
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when their presumptions of autonomy should be overrid-
den.173
D. “. . . and the weeds too” or the Competition/Politics Approach
A final approach would be no approach at all.  Rather
than trying to solve fragmentation, such an approach would
encourage communities to do battle over norms.  This per-
spective looks beyond the battle in a given court or tribunal to
the broader battle for community acceptance.
Unlike some of the other approaches, a competition ap-
proach does not look at fragmentation as a problem.  On the
contrary, fragmentation, on this view, can be beneficial.174
One of the problems underlying fragmentation is that any
given court, tribunal, or expert body may have a limited man-
date and may accordingly lack the perceived legitimacy to
speak authoritatively to the interests of different international
law communities.  A human rights body may be perceived as
incompetent to consider international humanitarian law is-
sues; a trade body’s authority to speak to environmental or
human rights concerns may be questioned.
One way to solve this legitimacy problem, particularly
where the creation of a single authoritative body seems un-
likely, is to deny any given body a monopoly over interpreta-
173. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 10, at 1197 (“Thus, each of R
the mechanisms described in this Part encounter excruciatingly difficult and
probably impossible to resolve problems as to how best to determine when
norms of one community should give way to norms of another and when, in
contrast, pluralism can be maintained.”); id. at 1236 (“The messiness of hy-
bridity also means that it is impossible to provide answers ex ante regarding
occasions when pluralism should be honored and occasions when it should
be trumped.”); Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurispru-
dence of the European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law, 11
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113, 125 (2004) (“For over thirty years the Court has been
using the margin of appreciation and trying to explain that use with clarity.
It has failed.  Today the doctrine remains broad, vague, and largely unde-
fined, leading to unpredictable (and often arbitrary) results.”); Mark L. Mov-
sesian, Judging International Judgments, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 65, 112 (2007)
(“[D]octrines like subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation seem too
vague to constrain international courts in the long run.  Even in the Euro-
pean context, critics complain about how malleable these doctrines are.”).
174. See, e.g., William Thomas Worster, Competition and Comity in the Frag-
mentation of International Law, 34 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 119, 140–49 (2008)
(concluding that competition among tribunals can result in constructive di-
versity).
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tion and dispute resolution.175  Allowing fora to compete al-
lows multiple legal communities to reasonably claim that their
view is the correct one.  Debates over international law are
eventually resolved not through courts, but through public de-
bate and persuasion.  This approach has the added benefit of
limiting the risks inherent in tribunals applying laws and prin-
ciples they don’t fully understand.  Each tribunal would be en-
couraged to stay within its own competence and expertise.
When the interests of other communities do make their way
into their decisions, it will be through modes of interpretation
that the tribunal’s community can find plausibly legitimate.
Returning to the Kadi case, the eventual decision of the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) may provide an example of
such an approach in action.  In its decision, the ECJ, like the
CFI before it, held that it could not review the Security Coun-
cil’s imposition of sanctions on individuals accused of support-
ing terrorism.  Nonetheless, it held that European regulations
implementing the Security Council’s decision, which were
within the ECJ’s jurisdiction to review, must be invalidated to
the extent to which they did not meet the due process norms
of European law.  Perhaps as evidence that this sort or compe-
tition approach can work, the decision put European mem-
bers of the Security Council in an awkward position, forcing
them to reengage with the Council on the issue, eventually re-
sulting in reforms to the Security Council process.176  Another
example might be the back-and-forth jockeying between the
ICJ and the ICTY over whether “effective control”177 or “over-
175. See generally Cogan, supra note 5 (arguing that increasing competition R
among international courts will more effectively constrain international judi-
cial power and increase States’ willingness to accede to international judicial
authority).
176. See C. H. Powell, The United Nation Security Council, Terrorism and the
Rule of Law, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY 37–41 (Victor V.
Ramraj et al. eds, 2012); see also Mattias Kumm, How Does European Union
Law Fit into the World of Public Law? Costa, Kadi, and Three Conceptions of Public
Law, in POLITICAL THEORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 134 (Jurgen Neyer &
Antje Wiener eds., 2010); see generally Christopher Michaelsen, The Security
Council’s  Practice of Blacklisting Alleged Terrorists and Associates: Rule of Law Con-
cerns and Prospects for Reform, 8 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L. 71 (2010).
177. See ICJ, Application of Genocide Convention, supra note 171, ¶ 406 R
(reasserting the “effective control” test after Tadic); Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶
109–115 (setting out the “effective control” test).
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all control”178 is the proper test for attributing military actions
to a state.
The obvious drawback to a competition approach is that it
sacrifices the short-term for the future. Short-term losses in va-
rious fora may mean real injuries to communities or persons—
injuries that may simply be too much for some to bear.179  Pris-
oners may be executed in the course of debates over the death
penalty,180 Israel’s security barrier/wall/fence will remain in
place as the battle between the ICJ and Israeli Supreme Court
plays out,181 prisoners at Guantanamo may have to wait for le-
gal process,182 Israel will be forced to defend itself internation-
ally against the Goldstone Report while relations between
human rights law and international humanitarian law are
worked out, and the environment may be damaged or prop-
erty rights lost in disputes between trade, investment, environ-
mental, and indigenous rights communities.183  For those op-
posed to these results, waiting for more broadly legitimate law
may be waiting too long.
There is also no guarantee that better rules will always win
the competition.  It is just as likely that the victors will be those
178. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment in the Appeals
Chamber, ¶¶ 115–45 (July 15, 1999) (rejecting the ICJ’s “effective control”
test).
179. The foregoing listed are not injuries of my concern but would be the
injuries anticipated by those concerned about competition.
180. See generally Medellı´n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (holding in a
habeas challenge to a murder conviction that an ICJ decision was not en-
forceable in U.S. courts); Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights:
International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against
Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002) (discussing three
Commonwealth Caribbean governments’ denunciation of human rights
treaties and petition procedures as a result of a series of rulings, by the Judi-
cial Committee of the Privy Council, restricting the execution of criminal
defendants); Manuel Roig-Franzia, Mexican National Executed in Texas, WASH.
POST, Aug. 6, 2008, at A6 (discussing the execution of Medellı´n despite a
prior ICJ ruling that Medellı´n deserved to have his case reviewed).
181. See generally HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel [2004]
IsrSC 58(4) 807, reprinted in 43 I.L.M. 1099 (2004) (approving the construc-
tion of the wall); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9)
(holding that the construction of the wall is contrary to international law).
182. For examples of cases involving Guantanamo prisoners, see supra
note 144. R
183. For examples of cases involving these issues, see supra notes 166–67. R
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actors and those communities influential enough to impose
their will through international politics or strong enough to
wait other communities out.
* * * *
Each of these approaches has benefits and drawbacks, and
it may not be possible to say with certainty that one approach
is superior to another in the abstract.  Assessments of each ap-
proach seem inescapably tied to, even dominated by, questions
about power.  Who will control the ultimate shape of the law:
the states and tribunals who control traditional doctrine,184
the actors who control the communities whose views are
granted room or respect, the tribunals who decide when to
turn a margin of appreciation on or off, or those actors strong
enough to outlast their competitors?  A completely neutral ap-
proach seems impossible.  From a legal standpoint, the best we
may be able to do is choose one approach, apply it consist-
ently, recognize its weaknesses, and work to mitigate its
harms.185  But the unavoidability of considerations of power
perhaps highlights the reality that conflicts between communi-
ties over legitimacy rules can only ultimately be resolved
through politics.
V. CONCLUSION
The purview of international regimes concerning the en-
vironment, trade, human rights, and armed conflict continue
to expand.  The number of norm articulating bodies contin-
ues to multiply.  Instances of conflict between them seem des-
tined to rise.  And the parade of proposed solutions to interna-
184. See generally Tomer Broude, Principles of Normative Integration and the
Allocation of International Authority: The WTO, the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, and the Rio Declaration, 6 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 173 (2008).
185. Intriguingly, these four approaches demonstrate that discussions of
fragmentation and now-popular discussions of constitutionalization in inter-
national law are inextricably intertwined.  Each of these approaches might
be seen as a set of constitutional conflicts rules, whether in the form of
supremacy clauses, dictating a hierarchy of sources, full-faith-and-credit
clauses, providing for comity between regimes, or fundamental rights and
default rules that serve as constitutional trumps.  The more general interna-
tional law responds to fragmentation by taking on the role of a conflicts
regime, the more its rules will look constitutional in form.
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tional law’s fragmentation seems likely to march on indefi-
nitely.
But in developing their proposed solutions, few scholars
or judges have taken the time to ask what the reality of frag-
mentation tells us about the nature of international law.  In
fact, the fragmentation of international law, the progressive
development of alternative understandings of international
law doctrine, has only highlighted a broader problem in inter-
national law—that doctrine only marginally resembles interna-
tional law as practiced, that doctrinal categories have become
mere formalities into which current practice must be plugged.
Recognizing this reality and rethinking international law’s
sources can provide a fresh approach to fragmentation, help-
ing to clarify what’s really at stake in conflicts over interna-
tional law’s content and meaning.  A revised doctrine of
sources can highlight, rather than hide, the deep normative
conflicts that may underlie disagreements between human
rights and international humanitarian law, international envi-
ronmental law and international investment.  And in place of
ineffective doctrinal tweaks that might only exacerbate ex-
isting conflicts or raise questions about international law’s
force, it can suggest forms of dialogue, settlement, and contes-
tation that recognize the depth of these disagreements even as
they seek to manage them.
